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Essays on Political Institutions and Institutional Design
Marcos Yamada Nakaguma
This dissertation attempts to understand the factors that determine the per-
formance and choice of political institutions. We start with the recognition that
these two aspects of the problem are fundamentally connected given that political
institutions are themselves endogenous, i.e. the way in which they perform and
function depends importantly on the reasons behind their adoption. Each chapter
of this dissertation analyzes a di¤erent class of institutions, identifying specic
features of the political and social environment that impact their performance and
deriving, whenever possible, implications for institutional design.
The rst chapter studies the main factors that determine the constitutional
preferences of citizens over the form of government. We focus on the case of
Brazil, where a referendum in 1993 allowed the population to choose between a
presidential and a parliamentary system of government. A model is proposed to
explain the main facts emerging from the data. It is shown that the parliamentary
regime requires a strong system of protection against expropriation, particularly
at the local level, and a class of politicians that can be trusted to represent well
the interests of voters. We also show that the poor groups of the population are
more likely to vote for the presidential regime since the low quality of their local
accountability institutions makes them more vulnerable to the expropriation by
legislators.
The second chapter studies the question of why checks and balances work well in
some cases, but not in others. We investigate the conditions under which a system
of checks and balances is benecial to the society. The analysis emphasizes the
important role played by political transparency, which is dened as the ability of
voters to observe the proposals submitted to congress during the legislative process.
We show that transparency is a necessary, but not su¢ cient, condition for an
e¤ective system of checks and balances. The model yields the surprising result that
political transparency may be harmful to voters depending on the characteristics
of the social and political environment.
The third chapter studies a committee decision-making problem with career
oriented agents who may be biased towards one of the alternatives. We investigate
how the interaction between career concerns and bias a¤ects the behavior of mem-
bers and how this e¤ect depends on transparency. The main result is that public
voting leads to better decisions when the magnitude of the bias is large relative to
the common value, while secret voting performs better otherwise. We also show
that the interaction between transparency and reputation concerns may exacer-
bate the biases of incompetent members, leading them to vote more in accordance
with their individual interests.
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1CHAPTER 1
Choosing the Form of Government: Theory and Evidence
From Brazil
1.1. Introduction
The form of government is one of the most important features of the organi-
zation of a democracy. It establishes rules about how the government is to be
appointed and removed from o¢ ce. There are two major systems: (i) the pres-
idential regime, where the executive is directly elected by voters and has a xed
term in o¢ ce, and (ii) the parliamentary regime, where the executive is appointed
by the parliament and may be removed if receives a vote of no condence. The
choice of the form of government is a recurrent and controversial issue in many
societies and debates about it are expected to gain further relevance in the near
future as more countries move to a democratic regime and as new democracies
gradually consolidate.1
Despite the existence of a large literature studying the di¤erences between
presidential and parliamentary systems, little attention has been devoted to the
1The possibility of changes in the government regime has been recently considered in Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, South Korea, Tunisia,
Turkey, among other countries (Cheibub [2007]).
2question of what determines the choice of the form of government. Furthermore,
among the few papers that do examine this issue, the focus has been either on
the historical context behind the choice (Persson and Tabellini [2003] and Cheibub
[2007]) or on the interests of the elites to impose a particular regime (Lijphart
[1992], Easter [1997] and Robinson and Torvik [2009]). However, the dilemmas
posed by constitutional reform in modern societies make it crucial that we un-
derstand how this issue is viewed by citizens, particularly because such decisions
are likely to depend increasingly on the populations consent, either informally
(through protests and public manifestations) or formally (through a referendum).
This paper studies the main factors that determine the constitutional prefer-
ences of citizens over the form of government. We focus on the case of Brazil,
where a referendum in 1993 allowed the population to choose between a presiden-
tial and a parliamentary system. In doing so, we rely on a novel data set consisting
of the results of the referendum at municipal level as well as several opinion polls
conducted at that time.2 This information provides a unique opportunity to ob-
serve the constitutional preferences of di¤erent population groups and allow us to
approach the question of the choice of the form of government directly from the
perspective of citizens.
The analysis of the data reveals an interesting new fact. While the Brazilian
population in general voted more for the presidential system, there is a strong
2In Brazil, a municipality is dened as the smallest administrative subdivision to have its own
democratically elected leadership, a mayor and a local assembly.
3positive relationship between income per capita and the percentage of votes cast
for the parliamentary regime in the cross-section of municipalities. That is, the
poor (rich) groups of the population voted more for the presidential (parliamen-
tary) system. Using detailed survey data, we show that this evidence cannot be
explained by the fact that the poor individuals simply lacked knowledge about
the referendum and, therefore, voted more for the presidential system merely be-
cause it represented the status quo. Moreover, the correlation between income per
capita and vote in the referendum is shown to robust to controlling for several
socioeconomic and political characteristics of municipalities, such as population
size, income inequality, illiteracy and vote for the main political parties.
We further document that among the electorate a common reason to reject
the parliamentary system was the absence of direct elections for the executive
in connection with the lack of condence in congress. The general perception
was that corruption was widespread among legislators and that a parliamentary
system would further exacerbate the problem. As in many developing countries,
corruption was (and still is) a major concern in Brazil. The magnitude of the
problem is enormous: it is estimated that, every year, at least US$ 3:5 billions are
diverted through corruption only from the federal funds transferred to muncipal
governments for investment in basic education, health and infra-structure.3
3These estimates are based on audit reports published by the Controladoria-Geral da Uniao
(CGU) (Folha de Sao Paulo, 9/4/2011).
4Why did the Brazilian population, especially the poor, vote more for the presi-
dential system? We propose a model to explain the general pattern of the referen-
dum results. The analysis focuses on a fundamental di¤erence between presidential
and parliamentary systems. On the one hand, direct elections for president allow
voters to hold the executive leader directly accountable, but imply that the presi-
dent may not be removed from o¢ ce before elections. On the other hand, the vote
of no condence transfers to parliament the responsibility to check the executive,
but provides a mechanism to replace the prime-minister before the end of his term.
The model emphasizes that the bargaining power of legislators is higher under
parliamentary systems. This enables them to push for larger transfers to con-
stituencies, which in turn expands their own capacity to extract rents. Intuitively,
these funds are intended to nance the provision of local public goods (e.g. in-
vestment in education), but are also subject to expropriation by legislators. Since
the quality of the local accountability institutions (e.g. local media and courts)
is heterogeneous across regions, and lower in poor constituencies, the burden of
corruption falls disproportionately on the poor population.4;5 As a result, the par-
liamentary system tends to be less attractive to the poor than to the rich.
4In Brazil, the quality of local institutions displays considerable regional variation. For instance,
Pinheiro and Cabral (1999) report that members of the judiciary tend to be less prepared in
poorer regions, citing the case of a judge who still used old and revoked legislation to base his
decisions.
5This implication of the model is consistent with Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2011) who nd that
the presence of local media (i.e. a radio station or a local newspaper) reduces the incidence of
corruption in Brazilian municipalities.
5In a presidential system, on the other hand, the bargaining power of legislators
is diminished, which limits the size of tranfers and the amount of political rents
that they are able to obtain. Now, it is the executive leader who is in a stronger
position to extract rents, which he does by deviating resources from the federal
budget. These funds are constituted by the tax revenue collected from citizens,
over which the executive has administrative authority.6 At the national level, the
executive leader is subjected to the control of institutions such as large media
companies (especially newspapers), federal prosecutors and investigative agencies,
which provide common protection to the general population.7 As a result, the
burden of corruption imposed by the executive leader is shared equally among
voters.
The model also generates other interesting results. We examine how the form
of government inuences the choice of a national public policy (e.g. a reform of
the social security system) in an environment where the policy preference of voters
and o¢ ce-holders (the executive leader and legislators) may become misaligned
6The model captures the idea that the corruption practices of executive leaders tend to be more
centralized and broader in scope, impacting larger sectors of the population at once. This notion is
consistent with several corruption cases uncovered recently in Latin America and other countries.
For instance, presidents Fernando Collor de Mello (Brazil), Arnoldo Aleman (Nicaragua), Alberto
Fujimori (Peru) and Carlos Andres Perez (Venezuela) were all charged of running vast corruption
schemes, often involving outright expropriation of public funds (e.g. Fujimori was found guilty
of giving US$ 15 million out of the Peruvian treasury to his former intelligence service chief) and
large scale inuence-peddling schemes (e.g. Collor de Mello run through his campaign treasurer
a vast scheme that sold "government favours" all around the country).
7The distinction between national and local institutions is a feature of the model which is also
emphasized by the literature on scal decentralization (Prudhomme [1995], Tanzi [1995] and
Oates [1999]).
6after elections, due to the occurrence of a "preference shock". We show that the
parliamentary system leads to comparatively better policies for the population
as long as the likelihood that each o¢ ce-holder remains aligned with his voters
is large enough. Intuitively, this condition requires that the quality of political
representation in the society be su¢ ciently high.
The traditional argument in favor of parliamentarism is that it allows for the
possibility of replacing an unpopular or incompetent government prior to elections.8
Indeed, at the time of the referendum, many political analysts in Brazil defended
the parliamentary regime as the most "modern" and "exible" alternative, often
referring to the fact that most developed countries adopt it. However, our analy-
sis suggests that the parliamentarism is also the regime that is most "intensive"
in political institutions in that it requires a strong system of protection against
expropriation, particularly at the local level, and a class of politicians that can be
trusted to represent well the interests of voters.
This paper is related to a growing literature on endogenous political institu-
tions, which includes Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Aghion and Bolton (2003),
8In a recent article entitled "Does Egypt Need a Pharaoh?", Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz argued
for the adoption of a parliamentary system in Egypt on the basis that "to elect a president is to
commit to one person, generally for at least four years. But it is very uncertain that any person
elected today in Egypt would have the support in even a year. (. . . ) It is also possible that a
new president turns out to be incompetent, or is in a permanent minority position and unable
to pass legislation".
7Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2004), Barbera and Jackson (2004), Lizzeri and Per-
sico (2004), Maggi and Morelli (2006), Trebbi, Aghion and Alesina (2008), Robin-
son and Torvik (2009), Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) and Acemoglu, Robinson and
Torvik (2011). Among these papers, Robinson and Torvik (2009) is the one most
closely related to ours. They also study the question of the choice of the form of
government, although their main focus is on the interests of the political elites.
They argue that presidentialism is prevalent in Africa and Latin America because
it is the system that generates most rents to its leaders. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the type of presidential regime considered by these authors is one with
very little checks and balances, where the executive leader has extremely dominant
powers (like Joseph Mobutu in Zaire and Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe).
Although the argument put forward by Robinson and Torvik (2009) may well
apply to a number of historical contexts, our analysis suggests that it cannot be
taken as a general explanation for the predominance of presidential systems among
developing countries, especially in Latin America. With this respect, the present
paper sheds new light on the question of the endogenous choice of the form of
government by focusing specically on the interests of citizens. We also contribute
to the literature by providing novel evidence about the constitutional preferences
of voters in Brazil. To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the rst to
use referendum data to investigate this important issue.
The results of this paper are also related to Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) who
emphasize the fact that di¤erent institutions are often closely linked to each other.
8This feature makes it particularly di¢ cult to isolate the e¤ect of specic aspects
of the institutional environment (i.e. the issue of "unbundling institutions"). In-
terestingly, our model shows that the choice of the form of government depends on
the quality of the accountability institutions in a country. This result has impor-
tant implications for empirical and policy-oriented research. For instance, several
recent papers have argued that presidentialism leads to more corruption (e.g. Led-
erman, Loayza and Soares [2005], Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman [2005]). However,
our analysis of the Brazilian experience suggests that causality might run in the
opposite direction, that is, it is possible that countries more prone to corruption
may self-select into presidential systems.
This paper is also connected to a number of studies in comparative politics
that have examined the di¤erences between presidential and parliamentary sys-
tems. An inuential view in this literature is that presidential democracies are
inherently less stable and more prone to coups. This notion has been argued by
Linz (1978, 1990) and Stepan and Skach (1993), among others, based on the fact
that the relationship between executive and legislative tends to be more conicted
under presidential regimes. However, many scholars, including Shugart and Carey
(1992), Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) and Cheibub (2007), have challenged this
view. According to Cheibub (2007), the problem is not that presidential systems
are fundamentally awed, but rather that "they tend to exist in societies where
democracies of any type are likely to be unstable". Thus, in order to fully com-
prehend the political and economic consequences associated with each system, one
9must understand, in the rst place, the reasons behind its adoption. The present
study provides a contribution in this direction.
In the political economy literature, Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) were
the rst to propose a formal model to study the comparative performance between
presidential and parliamentary regimes.9 They show that presidential systems are
associated with less political rents, while parliamentary systems have more redis-
tribution towards broad population groups and higher provision of public goods.
Their model, however, assumes that all voters are homogeneous and does not al-
low for direct elections for president, a feature which we show to be of particular
importance for citizens in Brazil. As such, their framework is unable to account
for the stylized facts presented in this paper, particularly the evidence that the
poor groups of the population voted more for the presidential regime.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1:2 provides a brief
historical backgroud of the Brazilian referendum and presents the main stylized
facts emerging from our empirical analysis. Section 1:3 introduces the basic setup
of the model and discusses its main assumptions. Section 1:4 solves for a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of the model and section 1:5 presents our main compar-
ative results, providing a characterization of the constitutional preferences of the
various groups of the population. Section 1:6 concludes.
9In related work, Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004) provide cross-country evidence that pres-
idential systems have smaller governments, while parliamentary regimes have more persistent
scal outcomes (i.e. increases in government spending during downturns are not reversed during
booms).
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1.2. Brazils Referendum of 1993
1.2.1. Historical Background
In April 1993, the Brazilian population voted on a referendum to choose between
a presidential and a parliamentary system of government.10 The decision to hold
the referendum had been agreed upon ve years earlier, during the discussions
that lead to the democratic constitution of 1988. The proposal for its realization
received strong support among members of the constitutional assembly and served
as a compromise solution for the controversial issue that the choice of the form of
government proved to be.11 It was, then, decided that a presidential system would
be adopted provisionally until the realization of the referendum in 1993.
The period between the early 80s and the mid 90s, often referred to as Brazils
"lost decade", was marked by a series of economic di¢ culties, beginning with the
debt crisis of the 80s and followed by a long period of stagation. At the same
time, the country faced important problems related to its fragmented party sys-
tem and widespread corruption in both the executive and the congress. Indeed,
10Figure A.1 depicts the actual ballot used in the referendum. In addition to the question
regarding the decision between "parliamentarism" and "presidentialism", voters were also asked
to choose between "monarchy" and "republic"   the republican regime was ultimately adopted
with 66% of total votes.
11The presidential regime received active support from the goverment of president Jose Sarney
(1985-1990), who hoped to stay in o¢ ce for the remainder of his term. It also received the
adherence of parties with strong candidates in the next presidential elections, including the PT
(Luis Inacio Lula da Silva) and the PDT (Leonel Brizola). For more historical details, see Silva
(1990) and Bonavides and Andrade (2004).
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the rst popularly elected president after the military regime, Fernando Collor
de Mello, was impeached in 1992 amid accusations of running a vast inuence-
peddling scheme. Around the same time, a massive corruption scandal was uncov-
ered involving at least forty three members of the congress, several public o¢ cials
and a cartel of construction rms that controlled the procurement of public works
in several parts of the country.12
The debates around the referendum concentrated broadly on two main themes:
the issue of governability, i.e. the ability of government to respond e¢ ciently
to crisis and changes in the political environment, and the lack of condence in
the political institutions.13 On the one hand, it was argued that a parliamentary
system would help to create the necessary conditions for the approval of social
and economic reforms, given the requirement that the government be supported
by a majority in parliament. On the other hand, it was argued that only under
a presidential system would the population be able to directly choose its leaders
and, as a result, to have more inuence on politics.
For approximately two months prior to the referendum, daily programs on TV
and radio were broadcasted to present and explain the various arguments in favour
and against each alternative.14 The parliamentary system received great support
12See Fleischer (1997) for more details.
13See Lamounier (1992) for an overview of the main topics involved in the discussions.
14The Brazilian electoral law obliges all TV and radio stations to broadcast campaign advertise-
ments free of charge. The time on TV and radio was divided equally between the two campaigns.
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among legislators. A survey conducted in 1991 showed that 74% of the members of
the congress were favorable to this alternative, although some parties with strong
candidates in the upcoming elections ended up backing the presidentialism.15
As shown in Figure 1:1, the parliamentary regime started ahead in the polls.
However, this advantage quickly faded as the campaigns on TV and radio began
in mid-February, after which one observes a marked shift in preferences towards
the presidentialism. Many political analysist attributed this change to an increase
in votersperception that the parliamentary system was, in fact, the "government
of congress". Indeed, one of the ads of the pro-presidentialism campaign invited
the viewer to imagine "what would happen if we put the country in the hands of
the deputies".
The nal result of the referendum is reported in Table 1:1. The presidential
system was the alternative chosen by the population with 55% of the votes. Note
that a considerable fraction of individuals, approximately 20%, cast a null or blank
vote. The turnout was around 75%:16 Overall, the parliamentary regime received
more votes in the rich states of the southeast, such as Sao Paulo (34:5%) and Rio
de Janeiro (26:6%), and less votes in the poor states of the northeast, such as Piaui
(11:2%) and Paraiba (12:7%).
15The survey was conducted by the Instituto de Estudos Economicos, Sociais e Politicos de Sao
Paulo (IDESP), an independent research institute (Jornal da USP, 12/07/1992).
16Vote is mandatory in Brazil.
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After the referendum, many explanations for the defeat of the parliamentary
system were suggested by analysts and politicians involved in the campaigns. The
congress and the political parties were among the most blamed. According to
a newspaper article, "The supporters of the parliamentarism agree that the im-
age of the congress and the recent scandals involving the institution did not help.
What you hear the most among the public is: not with this congress, not with
this congress, laments Jose Serra [one of the leaders of the pro-parliamentarism
campaign]" (Folha de Sao Paulo, 04/18/1993). Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, presi-
dent of the country during 2002-2010 and at that time leader of the Labor Party,
explained the result of the referendum in the following terms: "The Brazilian con-
gress is an institution that does not have the trust of the population." (Isto É,
04/28/1993).17 Almost fteen years later, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, president
during 1994-2002 and a strong supporter of the parliamentary alternative, admit-
ted: "After my experience as president and in retrospect, I have many doubts.
In reality, the parliamentary regime would have required a much stronger party
system." (Agencia Brasil, 10/03/2008).
17Interestingly, the impeachment process of president Collor de Mello (Jan/1991-Oct/1992),
which occurred in a relatively orderly fashion and counted with an active involvement of the
population, seems to have had the actual e¤ect of stregthening the votersbeliefs in their ability
to hold the government accountable. This idea was, in fact, explored by the pro-presidentialism
campaign, which used to emphasize the fact that in a presidential system "you choose (the
president), and you can remove".
14
1.2.2. Empirical Evidence: New Facts
This subsection presents new facts about the results of the Brazilian referendum
of 1993.18 Figure 1:2 plots the relationship between income per capita and the
percentage of votes cast for the parliamentary system, with each municipality rep-
resented as a circle proportional to its population. The graph shows the existence
of a strong positive correlation between income per capita and the percentage of
votes for the parliamentary system across Brazilian municipalities. Remarkably,
the R2 of this simple regression is 0:63. Observe that this relationship is not sys-
tematically driven by population size, despite the fact that larger municipalities do
tend to be richer on average. Furthermore, in Figures 1:3 and 1:4, we show respec-
tively that this result cannot be accounted by (i) the percentage of null and blank
votes in the referendum and (ii) political ideology, as measured by the percentage
of votes for Luis Inacio da Lula da Silva (PT) in 1994.19
One explanation for this evidence could be attributed to the fact that poor indi-
viduals simply lacked knowledge about the referendum and, therefore, voted more
for the presidential system merely because it represented the status quo. In order
to investigate this possibility, we use information on an opinion survey which asked
individuals to point out at least two di¤erences between presidential and parlia-
mentary regimes. Since the answers to this question were spontaneous, they allow
18See appendix A:1 for a description of the data.
19Lula was the most prominent left-wing candidate in the presidential elections of 1989 and 1994.
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us to identify a subgroup of people who can be considered to be "knowledgeable"
enough about the referendum.
Out of 2; 607 subjects interviewed, 1; 059 (40:6%) were able to correctly iden-
tify two or more di¤erences between both alternatives.20 Table 1:2 provides a
summary of the voting intentions for subjects in the full sample and in the sub-
sample of "informed individuals". Surprisingly, voters with more knowledge about
the referendum were comparatively more likely to vote for the presidential rather
than the parliamentary system. Figure 1:5, then, plots the voting intentions of
informed and uninformed individuals for di¤erent classes of income. Observe that,
contrarily our initial expectation, informed poor individuals were actually more
likely to vote for the presidential system.21 We, therefore, conclude that informa-
tion about the referendum does not seem to account for the stylized fact presented
above.
We further investigate the determinants of the constitutional preferences of
voters in Brazil by performing a detailed regression analysis. Table 1:3 presents
20Common answers to this question were: "the prime-minister is elected by the parliament",
"the president is chosen by the population", "the congress is in charge" and "the power belongs
to the president".
21Observe that the voting intention for the parliamentary system increases sharply among un-
informed individuals as one moves from "less than 2 minimum wages" to "between 2 and 5
minimum wages". We conjecture that part of this increase is driven by the fact that the very
poor individuals may have had a harder time articulating their answers to this relatively complex
question. As a result, some of them may have ended up being classied as "uninformed", even
though they actually knew the di¤erence between the two systems.
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the results of OLS regressions in which the percentage of votes cast for the parlia-
mentary system is regressed on four main socio-economic variables, i.e. logarithm
of income per capita, logarithm of population, illiteracy rate and the gini coe¢ -
cient (income inequality), as well as other municipal characteristics.22 Following
Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2011) and Litschig and Zamboni (2011), we also include
the number of AM radio stations and a dummy for the presence of federal judges
and prosecutors in each municipality. These authors have shown that the local
media and judiciary play an important role in restraining corruption at the mu-
nicipal level in Brazil, so that we use these variables as proxies for the presence of
local accountability institutions.
We restrict the sample to municipalities with less than 500; 000 citizens in
order to exclude large outliers from the analysis. The regressions reported in
columns [1] and [4] include state xed-e¤ects, while those in the remaining columns
include a set of 440 micro-region xed-e¤ects, which control for very particular
characteristics of the economic and social environment.23 Furthermore, in order
to capture specic aspects of the local politics, we add dummies for the party
22The municipal characteristics considered in the analysis are: percentage of the population living
in rural areas, population density (inhabitants/km2), state capital dummy, distance to the state
capital, percentage of abstention, percentage of null votes and percentage of votes cast for the
PMDB, the PSDB and the PT candidates in the 1994 presidential elections.
23A micro-region is dened as a group of contiguous municipalities in a given state that share an
urban center and have similar demographic, economic, and agricultural characteristics.
17
a¢ liation of mayors in columns [3] and [6]. All standard errors are clustered at the
micro-region level.
Overall, the estimates reveal a consistent pattern. The vote for the parliamen-
tary system is positively correlated with income per capita and population, while
negatively correlated with inequality (gini) and illiteracy. Interestingly, the esti-
mates for the number of AM radio stations and the presence of federal judges and
prosecutors are positive and statistically signicant across all specications, sug-
gesting that the local institutional environment is indeed relevant for the decisions
of voters. Altogether, our results provide robust evidence for the existence of a
strong relationship between the socio-economic and institutional characteristics of
municipalities and the results of the referendum.
Why not a parliamentary system? We now proceed to examine the main
reasons behind the vote of Brazilian citizens in the referendum. Figure 1:6 presents
the results of a survey which asked subjects why they would not vote for the
parliamentary system. The most common reason mentioned was that "citizens
do not have the right to elect the leader and/or the members of the parliament
are the ones who choose", which amounts to 28% of the individuals who reported
not voting for this alternative. Furthermore, when the sample is restricted to
the subgroup of informed voters, following the same criteria dened above, the
percentage of individuals dissatised with the lack of direct elections increases to
18
41%, while the fact that "the congress is corrupt" was pointed out by 12% as the
main reason to reject this alternative.
As discussed before, the sense of dissatisfaction with congress and the political
class in general was generalized among the population. We provide further evi-
dence on this issue by exploring a detailed survey which asked citizens about their
degree of condence in congress. Specically, we focus on two particular questions,
namely "What is your level of trust in congress?" and "Do you think that the mem-
bers of the congress represent the interests of the population?", in order to create
two dummy variables for those subjects who responded, respectively, "very low
trust" and "no, the legislators do not represent our interests". We, then, estimate
the impact of these variables on the probability that an individual votes for the
parliamentary system.
Table 1:4 presents the estimation results. The analysis controls for several
important variables, including household income, level of schooling, a measure
of political ideology and the candidate voted in the second round of the 1989
presidential elections, among other individual characteristics.24 We also include
a set of municipal xed-e¤ects in order to control for the place of residence of
each subject. This implies that the identication is based solely on variations
across individuals living in the same municipality. Columns [1] and [4] report the
24The individual characteristics included in the regressions are: gender, age, age squared, two
dummy variables indicating whether the person knows the name of the president and the name of
the states governor and four dummy variables indicating whether the person is religious, favors
abortion, favors death penalty and serves in local communities.
19
results of basic logit regressions. The estimates for both variables of our interest
are negative and statistically signicant, implying that holding an unfavorable
view of the congress reduces the probability with which a person votes for the
parliamentary system.
As shown in columns [2] and [5], our estimates are robust to controlling for the
frequency with which an individual follows the political news and whether he or
she thinks that elections are an important mechanism to inuence the government.
Furthermore, as reported in columns [3] and [6], the results remain unchanged when
the regressions are estimated by OLS. It is interesting to observe that individuals
who follow political news frequently and are ideologically more inclined towards
the "left" tend to vote more for the parliamentary system, while those who believe
that elections are a "very important" mechanism to control the government tend to
vote more for the presidential regime. Overall, our results are consistent with the
anecdotal evidence from Brazil and provide compelling evidence that the support
for the parliamentary system depends importantly on the image of the congress
among voters.
1.2.3. Discussion
Our analysis of the Brazilian referendum has established the existence of impor-
tant and systematic di¤erences in voting patterns across population groups. From
a theoretical point of view, however, it is unclear why di¤erent people would have
distinct preferences over the form of government and, in particular, why the poor
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voters should be more inclined towards the presidential system. While there have
been several related studies in the recent political economy literature (Persson,
Roland and Tabellini [1997, 2000] and Robinson and Torvik [2009]), none of them
are able to fully account for the stylized facts presented above. In a sense, the
evidence from Brazil is quite puzzling. For instance, many critics of the presiden-
tialism have pointed out that this system is inherently less stable (Linz [1978] and
Stepan and Skach [1993]), while Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) have argued
that redistribution is larger under parliamentarism. From this perspective, and
particularly after a long period of military dictatorship (1964-85), it would have
been to expect that the Brazilian population, especially the poor, would have been
more supportive of the adoption of a parliamentary regime in order to decentralize
power and restrict the authority of the central government.
1.3. Model
This section proposes a model to compare the performance of presidential and
parliamentary systems of government. The analysis focuses on the fundamental
di¤erence between these two regimes: while in presidential systems the executive
leader is directly elected by voters and has a xed term in o¢ ce, in parliamentary
systems the executive leader is appointed by the parliament and may be replaced if
receives a vote of no condence. The model highlights the main trade-o¤s involved
in the choice between these two forms of government. We use this framework to
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investigate the factors that inuence the preferences of di¤erent population groups
over these alternatives.
1.3.1. Basic Setup
We consider a moral hazard model with a single period. Following Acemoglu and
Robinson (2001, 2006), the society is composed of two groups of voters, the "poor"
and the "rich", indexed respectively by superscripts p and r. The population
is distributed over n constituencies or localities, each consisting of a continuum
of agents of the same group (i.e. citizens are either all poor or all rich) with
measure 1. The number of poor and rich constituencies is given by np and nr, with
np > nr. We use the term "constituency" to broadly refer to a group of voters,
distinguished by its geographical location, which serves as an electoral base for a
representative. This structure applies naturally to the case where a majoritarian
system ("winner-take-all") is in place, but also captures essential features of a
proportional representation system with open party lists, given that candidates
usually target specic groups of voters in a certain region.25;26
25The geographic concentration of votes for legislators is a well documented phenomenon in many
countries that adopt multi-member district systems, e.g. Brazil (Fleischer [1976] and Ames [1995,
2001]), Colombia (Crisp and Ingall [2002] and Crisp and Desposato [2004]) and Japan (Hirano
[2006]). Formally, Myerson (1993) shows that such systems encourage candidates to cater to
narrow sub-constituencies ("favored minorities"). The intuition for this result is that appealing
to larger fractions of the electorate makes the candidate "vulnerable" to an opponent who is only
targetting the minimum number of voters required to win elections.
26Ames (1995), in his analysis of the Brazilian electoral system, remarks that "legally, candidates
may seek votes everywhere in their states, but in reality many concentrate their campaigns
geographically, nding most of their support in one or more contiguous regions, regions popularly
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The utility function of each individual i is given by:






where  2 [0; 1] is a common tax rate, yi is the income level, `i  0 represents
the provision of a local public good in individual is constituency (e.g. investment
in education), x 2 R is the position of a national public policy (e.g. a reform of
the social security system) in the ideological space and i 2 fL; Hg denotes the
agents preference over x, with H   L =  > 0. The parameter  is such that
0 <  < 1, which guarantees that the utility function is increasing and concave in
`i.
We suppose that the members of each group are identical in all respects. The
poor voters have income yp and preference p 2 fL; Hg, while the rich have
income yr, with yr > yp, and preference r 2 fL; Hg. The average income is
normalized to one, y = 1
n
(npyp + nryr) = 1, so that yp < 1 < yr.
The population is represented by n + 1 elected o¢ cials, one executive leader,
e, and n legislators, l 2 f1; :::; ng, elected in their respective constituencies. The
utility function of each o¢ ce-holder j (executive leader or legislator) is given by:
(1.2) Vj = sj   1
2
(x  j)2 ;
referred to as "electoral strongholds" (redutos eleitorais). Why concentrate in a specic area?
For diverse reasons: the candidatesfamilies have long held power in the region; a party leader
sent them to the area; they appeal to its voters; they make a deal with a local political leader."
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where sj  0 represents the amount of rents expropriated by o¢ ce-holder j and
j 2 fL; Hg denotes his preference parameter.
The vector of policies is given by (x; ( ; '; se) ; f(`i; si)gni=1) and consists of a
set of variables determined through the political process. The public policy x and
the budget policy ( ; '; se) are decided at the national level and must satisfy the
aggregate budget constraint:
(1.3) n'+ se  n;
where ' represents a lump-sum transfer common to all constituencies and se is the
amount of rents expropriated by the executive leader.27 At the local level, transfers
are allocated between the provision of local public goods, `i, and political rents to
the local legislator, si, subject to the following budget constraint:28
(1.4) `i + si  '
We assume that the politicians cannot commit to policy platforms prior to
elections. This creates a moral hazard problem in that once in o¢ ce they will have
an incentive to implement the best policies for themselves. As in Persson, Roland
and Tabellini (1997, 2000), voters are able to discipline their representatives only
27Observe that the aggregate tax revenue is given by npyp + nryr, which equals to n under
the normalization that y = 1.
28With a slight abuse of notation, we use the subscript i to refer both to constituencies and their
members.
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"retrospectively" by threatening not to reelect them at the end of the period. The
executive leader and the legislators are assumed to receive, respectively, exogenous
rewards !E  0 and !L  0 when reelected. These parameters capture, in a re-
duced form fashion, the benets associated with continuing in o¢ ce and remaining
popular with voters, which include "ego rents", legacy motives and future rents.
1.3.2. Preference Structure
We assume that the preference of the poor citizens is always given by p = L. At
the beginning of the period, the rich voterstype is realized with Pr (r = L) = ,
where the parameter  can be interpreted as a measure of social homogeneity. After
that, the government is formed with all o¢ ce-holders aligned with the preference
of their respective constituencies. The executive leader has the same type as the
median (poor) voter, e = L, and all legislators have the same preference as their
constituents, i.e. the legislators representing the poor have type L, while those
representing the rich have type r.
A preference shock, then, occurs with probability  2 (0; 1) and may change
the preferences of all o¢ ce-holders. Each politician, executive leader or legislator,
remains aligned with their constituencies with probability  2 (0; 1), where the
parameter  can be interpreted as a measure of the quality of political represen-
tation in the society. After the occurrence of the shock, there are four possible
scenarios relevant to the analysis, two in which the preferences of the executive
leader and the median legislator are the same, e = lm, and two in which they
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are di¤erent, e 6= lm. We suppose that the o¢ ce-holdersnew types are drawn
independently from each other and that the preferences of the executive leader
and the median legislator are observed by everyone. Note that, since all shocks
are independent, nothing would change in the model if we allowed for a shift in
the voterspreferences, provided that, after the shock, Pr (p = r) =  and the
o¢ ce-holders are still aligned with probability .
This structure is intended to capture an environment in which the relevant
policy issue (e.g. international relations or scal policy) becomes known only after
the government is formed, due to uncertainty about the future state of the world.
The preference shock, thus, reects the possibility of changes in current economic
and political conditions combined with the fact that elected o¢ cials may not be
aligned with the interests of their constituencies in every policy dimmension. The
assumption that the preferences of the executive leader and the median legislator
are observed after the shock captures the idea that their stance on main political
issues are known from public speeches, debates and interviews as well as from their
past career and background.
1.3.3. Political Structure
The government is divided into two branches, the executive and the legislative, each
responsible for a distinct but complementary role in the policy-making process.
The legislative assembly is composed of n members elected in their constituencies,
while the executive is composed of a single member whose appointment process
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depends on the form of government. Specically, in a presidential system the pres-
ident is elected and held accountable directly by voters, while in a parliamentary
system the prime-minister is appointed and held accountable by the members of
the parliament, who can remove him through a vote of no condence.
After the uncertainty over preferences is resolved, the executive leader is called
upon to make a proposal eq = (ex; (e ; e'; ese)), which consists of a public policy ex and
a budget policy (e ; e'; ese). The proposal is, then, submitted to the legislative, where
representatives vote separately on ex and (e ; e'; ese). This structure captures both
the de jure and the de facto agenda-setting powers held by the executive leader
under each regime.29 Furthermore, the assumption of a separate vote on each issue
is consistent with the common practice in most legislatures, where distinct bills,
such as a budget proposal and a reform of the health care system, are discussed
and voted independently.
The legislative process di¤ers across the two systems. In the presidential
regime, each element of the proposal is approved if supported by a majority of
legislators. Otherwise, a default public policy xo = L+H
2
is implemented when ex
29Indeed, the majority of the bills in parliamentary systems are initiated by the cabinet, while
many presidential democracies, particularly those in Latin America, provide substantial agenda-
setting powers to their governments (Mainwaring and Shugart [1997]). Furthermore, even in the
United States, where the president has only limited authority to propose bills, the executive often
plays a fundamental role in shaping legislation. An example of this can be found in the conduct
of the Obama administration during the negotiations over the health care reform. According
to an article in the New York Times, "in pursuing his proposed overhaul of the health care
system, President Obama has consistently presented himself as aloof from the legislative fray,
merely o¤ering broad principles. (...) Behind the scenes, however, Mr. Obama and his advisers
have been quite active, sometimes negotiating deals with a degree of cold-eyed political realism
potentially at odds with the presidents rhetoric." (New York Times, 08/13/2009).
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is rejected, while a default budget ( o; 'o; soe) is adopted when (e ; e'; ese) is rejected.
In the parliamentary regime, on the other hand, after observing the proposal, the
members of the parliament vote on a motion of no condence on the executive.
Intuitively, in this case, the policy vector eq can be interpreted as the leaders "pro-
gram of government". If the vote of no condence is rejected, the prime-minister
remains in o¢ ce and the proposal is implemented. Otherwise, a new executive
leader e0 is appointed and given the chance to make another policy proposal eq0,
which is then voted against the status quo, as in a presidential system.
We assume that the new prime-minister is chosen among a pool of candidates
from outside the parliament and that the majority of legislators is able to select
an agent with the same preference as their own.30 As we shall discuss below, the
cases in which the vote of no condence can make a di¤erence are those where
the preferences of the executive leader and the median legislator are misaligned,
e 6= lm. The new prime-minister is not subject to a condence procedure, but is
held accountable by legislators who decide, by majority rule, whether to reappoint
him or not at the end of the period.31 The assumption of a single vote of no
condence is in line with the fact that many parliamentary democracies impose a
30The assumption that the new prime-minister is selected from outside the parliament is in line
with the notion of a caretaker technocratic government taking o¢ ce after the fall of the cabinet.
Recent examples of this include the governments lead by Lucas Papademos in Greece and Mario
Monti in Italy.
31Allowing the parliament to replace the government a nite number of times would not change
any of the results of the model.
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limit on the number of censure motions that can be proposed in a given period. It
also captures the idea that most political issues require that a decision be reached
in a timely manner in order to avert an imminent crisis or so that the policy itself
does not lose its e¤ectiveness.
After the legislative process is completed, a vector of policies (x; ( ; '; se))
is adopted under both systems and each legislator decides how to allocate the
transfers received by his constituency between the provision of local public goods,
`i; and expropriation of rents, si. Voters observe the policies (x; ( ; '; se)) and
(`i; si) as they are implemented. At the end of the period, they decide, by majority
rule, whether to reelect or not their representatives and the president based on their
acts during the period.
A strategy for citizens is a "retrospective voting rule", which species the con-
ditions under which an incumbent will receive their electoral support at the time
of elections. We impose that, in equilibrium, any voting rule must be credible
(i.e. satisfy subgame perfection) in the sense that voters would not want to reopti-
mize their strategies in later stages of the game, as additional information becomes
available. It is also assumed that a prime-minister who receives the condence of
the parliament is always reappointed, while the "second" prime-minister is held
accountable by legislators and depends on their support at the end of the period
to remain in o¢ ce. Intuitively, the new prime-minister has his proposal voted only




When a legislator i is not reelected, voters are able to recover the expropriated
resources with probability i 2 (0; 1), where the parameter i can be interpreted
as a measure of the quality of local accountability institutions. We assume that
the level of institutional protection in poor and rich constituencies is distinct, with
r > p. This heterogeneity generates a variation in the ability of voters to con-
straint expropriation at the local level, so that corruption imposes a greater burden
on the poor. Similarly, when the executive leader is not reappointed, the expro-
priated resources are recovered with probability  2 (0; 1), where the parameter
 captures the quality of national accountability institutions. The assumption
that the protection provided by institutions operates only when an o¢ ce-holder is
ousted from power is consistent with the fact that a thorough investigation of a
corruption scandal may be hindered either because the politician, while in o¢ ce,
is in a privileged position to manipulate evidence or because of the constitutional
immunities that are often granted to o¢ ce-holders.
1.3.5. Timing
To summarize, the timing of the events under a presidential system is as follows:
(1) The preference shock occurs with probability :
(2) The president makes a policy proposal eq = (ex; (e ; e'; ese)):
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(3) The congress votes separately on ex and (e ; e'; ese). Each element of the
proposal is approved if supported by a majority in congress. Otherwise, a
default public policy xo = L+H
2
is implemented when ex is rejected, while
a default budget ( o; 'o; soe) is adopted when (e ; e'; ese) is rejected.
(4) Each constituency i receives a transfer ' and the local legislator decides
how to allocate it between local public goods, `i, and political rents, si.
(5) Elections are held and voters decide whether to reelect their representa-
tives and the president.
The timing of the events under a parliamentary system is similar, except that
stages (3) and (5) are replaced by:
(30) The parliament votes on a motion of no condence on the executive. If
the vote of no condence is rejected, the prime-minister remains in o¢ ce
and the proposal is implemented. Otherwise, a new executive leader e0
is appointed and given the chance to make another proposal eq0, which is
then voted against the status quo.
(50) Elections are held and voters decide whether to reelect their representa-
tives. A prime-minister who receives the condence of the parliament is
automatically reappointed, while the "second" prime-minister depends on
the support of legislators to stay in o¢ ce.
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1.4. Equilibrium
This section solves for a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the model. We
proceed by backward induction, starting in subsection 1:4:1 with an analysis of the
nal subgame, which is common to both systems of government. The presidential
regime is, then, discussed in subsection 1:4:2 and the parliamentary regime in
subsection 1:4:3.
1.4.1. Local Politics
After the vector of policies q = (x; ( ; '; se)) is approved and observed by all, each
constituency receives a transfer ' and the local legislator decides how to allocate it
between the provision of local public goods and expropriation of rents. When the
legislator decides not to pursue reelection, his optimal strategy is to expropriate
all resources, in which case he obtains (1   i)' in expected utility. Therefore,
given the size of transfers ', voters in each constituency formulate their reelection
rules so as to minimize the amount of rents expropriated by legislator i according




subject to: 8><>: `i + si  ' (BCi)si + !L  (1  i)' (ICi)
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where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. The incentive compatibility constraint
(ICi) guarantees that the legislator prefers to pursue reelection rather than to
implement his outside option. At the optimum, both the budget and the incentive
constraint must bind, so that:
(1.6) si (') = max f(1  i)'  !L; 0g
and
(1.7) `i (') = ' max f(1  i)'  !L; 0g
Intuitively, equation (1:7) determines the minimum amount of local public goods
demanded by voters in order to reelect their representatives. In equilibrium, poli-
cies are always adopted according to these expressions and all legislators are reap-
pointed.
Observe that political rents are equal to zero when:
'  !L
1  i
In order to simplify the analysis, and to avoid uninteresting cases, we assume
that the status quo transfer is such that 'o > !L
1 p , which guarantees that the
amount of rents extracted by any legislator representing the poor is always strictly
positive. Observe that this condition can be re-expressed as !L < 1 (1  p)'o,
which requires that the reelection rewards of legislators are not too high.
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Assumption 1.1 !L < 1 (1  p)'o:
An important feature of the present model is that legislators are held account-
able for their behavior at the local level, despite the fact that they also perform
other actions prior to this stage. Note that any subgame perfect equilibrium re-
quires that, once transfers ' are observed, the optimal reelection strategy of voters
must be characterized according to problem (1:5). This renders any other voting
rule non-credible, as voters would always have an incentive to deviate from it after
transfers become known. The idea that representatives are held accountable by
their local behavior is particularly reasonable in an environment where citizens do
not have access to the individual voting record of their representatives, either due
to a low degree of political awareness or lack of congressional transparency.32
1.4.2. Presidential System
This subsection characterizes the policies implemented under a presidential system
of government, taking as given that the rents expropriated by legislators and the
provision of local public goods are determined, respectively, by equations (1:6) and
(1:7).
32These conditions are very likely to hold in new democracies and developing countries. According
to Ames (1995), "Brazilian citizens exert pressure for pork-barrel programs, but on broader issues
they have little control over their representatives. This should come as no surprise, because no
one observing a Brazilian election would feel condent that many voters know anything at all
about the positions of their deputies". Moreover, even in the case of a highly developed country
such as Japan, several studies have documented that a considerable fraction of the electorate
vote exclusively on the basis of local and parochial interests (Richardson [1997]).
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1.4.2.1. Legislative Process. Suppose that a proposal eq = (ex; (e ; e'; ese)) has
been submitted to the congress. Observe that it is dominant for each legislator to
vote in favor of the budget proposal (e ; e'; ese) if, and only if, sl(e')  sl ('o). Under
assumption 1:1, we have that sp ('o) > 0, so that the amount of rents extracted
by the poor legislators is positive and strictly increasing in transfers. Thus, the
condition for the approval of (e ; e'; ese) is:
(AP1) e'  'o
Similarly, the public policy ex is approved in congress if, and only if, a majority of
legislators prefers it to the status quo, xo = L+H
2
, which requires that:
(AP2)  1
2
(ex  lm)2   1
2




where lm denotes the the preference of the median legislator lm. We refer to these
conditions as the "approval constraints".
1.4.2.2. Incentive Constraint on the President. After the occurrence of the
preference shock, the executive leader is called upon to make a proposal eq: The
president is held accountable by voters, but has always the option to give up
reelection and propose a policy that maximizes his utility subject to the budget
constraint and the conditions for congressional approval, (AP1) and (AP2) : In this
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case, the president sets  = 1 and ' = 'o, which gives him n(1   )(1   'o) in
expected utility. Furthermore, when e = lm ; he is able to approve his preferred
reform x = e; while when e 6= lm he can obtain at most x = L+H2 , due to the
opposition of the congress.
Therefore, in order to induce the president to pursue reelection, voters must
satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraint:
(ICe) se   1
2




where 1fe 6=lmg is an indicator function that equals to one when the preferences
of the president and the median legislator are misaligned. In order to concentrate
on the interesting cases, we assume that   n(1  )(1  'o)   !E > 0, which
guarantees that the amount of rents extracted by the executive leader is always
strictly positive, se > 0. Intuitively, this condition requires that the reelection
rewards of the president are not too high.
Assumption 1.2 !E < n (1  )(1  'o).
1.4.2.3. Equilibrium. We assume that the poor voters coordinate their reelec-
tion strategies, so that they are decisive for the reappointment of the president.
This assumption is reasonable in the present context, since all members of this
group are identical. Thus, conditional on e and lm ; the poor citizens formulate
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their voting rules so as to maximize their utility according to the following problem:
(1.8) max
x2R; (;')2[0;1]2
(1  ) yp + 1

`p (')   1
2
(x  L)2
subject to 8><>: n'+ se  n (BC)(ICe) ; (AP1) ; (AP2)
The main properties of the equilibrium are summarized in the next lemma.33
Lemma 1.1 The equilibrium under a presidential system is characterized by the
following properties:
i: The tax rate may be lower than one,   1.
ii: The size of transfers is (weakly) increasing in the quality of institutions
available to the poor, p, and (weakly) decreasing in the poor voters in-
come, yp. Furthermore, transfers are always such that '  1  
n
.
iii: The amount of rents extracted by the executive leader is such that se  ,
with strict inequality when e 6= L.
iv: Given the median legislators type, the distance jx   Lj is largest when
the president is misaligned with the preference of the poor voters, e = H .
33All proofs of this paper are collected in appendix A.2.
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In a presidential system, the existence of direct elections for the executive
provides an institutional mechanism for the poor to inuence policies according to
their interests. In particular, the size of the taxes and transfers "demanded" by
them depend on the cost of taxation and on how e¤ectively the resources can be
converted into local public goods. Formally, the optimal transfers are such that:
' = max f'o; b'g ,
where, assuming that the constraint   1 does not bind, b' is implicitly determined
by:
(1.9) `p(b') 1p| {z }
marg. utility
= yp| {z }
marg. cost
Therefore, in equilibrium, transfers are: (i) (weakly) increasing in the quality of
institutions available to the poor, p, which reduces the expropriation of rents at
the local level, and (ii) (weakly) decreasing in the poor votersincome, yp, which
raises the cost of taxation for the members of this group.
An important drawback associated with direct elections is that they impose
a limit on the frequency with which voters are able to check the government, so
that a misaligned president, e = H , can never be removed from o¢ ce before the
end of his term. The executive leader is, therefore, in a strong position to push
for policies that are favorable to himself and, as a consequence, is able to extract
more rents and to distort the public policy towards his preferred position.
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Observe that, from the incentive compatibility constraint, it follows that polit-
ical rents are given by:
(1.10) se = +	(ex;),
where 	(ex;) = 1
2
(ex  e)2   1fe 6=lmg28 is the amount of rents that must be
paid above  in order to incentivize the president to propose a public policy ex.
When the executive leader is aligned with voters, e = L, the equilibrium entails
x = L when lm = L and x = H+L2 when lm = H , so that 	(x;) = 0 in both
cases. A misaligned executive leader, on the other hand, must be paid additional
rents in order to propose a policy that is closer to the voterspreference. The size
of these rents is given by:
(1.11) 	(ex;) = 1
2
(ex  H)2   1fe 6=lmg28
At the optimum, voters choose ex in order to equalize the marginal benet of
reducing the distance jex   Lj and the marginal cost of providing extra rents to
the president. Therefore, se  , with strict inequality when e 6= L, and, from




We now proceed to characterize the vector of policies implemented under a par-
liamentary system of government. As before, the rents expropriated by legislators
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and the provision of local public goods are determined, respectively, by equations
(1:6) and (1:7).
1.4.3.1. Legislative Process. Suppose that a "program of government" eq =
(ex; (e ; e'; ese)) has been proposed by the prime-minister. The members of the par-
liament vote on a motion of no condence on the executive. If the vote of no
condence is rejected, the prime-minister remains in o¢ ce and the proposal is
implemented, in which case each legislator obtains:
(1.12) Vl = sl(e')  1
2
(ex  l)2
If, on the other hand, the motion of no condence is approved, a new prime-
minister e0 is selected, with preference equal to the median legislator, e0 = lm,
and given the chance to make another proposal eq0, which is then voted against
the status quo. The new executive leader is not subjected to the condence of the
parliament, but legislators are able to hold him accountable through retrospective
voting, by threatening not to reappoint him at the end of the term. Specically,










0  n (BC)
se0   12 (x  e0)2   (ICe0)
where   n  1   (1  'o)  !E > 0 under assumption 1:2: As before, the in-
centive compatibility constraint (ICe0) guarantees that the executive leader prefers
to pursue reelection rather than adopting his outside option. Observe that there
is no conict associated with the public policy decision in this case, since both the
median legislator and the "second" prime-minister have identical preferences.
The optimal solution to this problem involves setting x = lm and se0 = .
Moreover, since the amount of rents expropriated by legislators is increasing in
transfers, and strictly so for any legislator representing the poor (under assumption
1), the reappointment rule species  = 1 and ' = 1  
n
, i.e. taxes and transfers
are set as high as possible. Therefore, the utility obtained by the median legislator
after a vote of no condence is:





1.4.3.2. Condence Requirement. From equations (1:12) and (1:14), it follows
that it is dominant for the median legislator to support the government in a vote
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of condence if, and only if, the initial proposal eq satises the following condition:
(CR) slm(e')  1
2




where we refer to this condition as the "condence requirement" constraint.
1.4.3.3. Equilibrium. Proceeding by backward induction, after the occurrence
of the preference shock, the prime-minister is called upon to make a proposal eq
subject to the condence requirement of the parliament. Formally, he proposes a
policy that maximizes his utility according to the following problem:
(1.15) maxex2R; (e;e')2[0;1]2 ese   12 (ex  e)2
s:t:
8><>: ne'+ ese  ne (BC)(CR)
When the preferences of the prime-minister and the median legislator are the
same, e = lm, the optimal solution is given by: x = lm, se = ,  = 1 and ' =
1  
n
. That is, the executive leader simply announces the exact same policies that
would have been proposed by his successor had he been defeated in the vote of no
condence. When, on the other hand, the prime-minister is not aligned with the
parliament, e 6= lm, the optimal solution involves a distortion of the reform away
from the median legislators preference in exchange for an increase in the size of
transfers to constituencies.
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Observe that the "relevant" median legislator for this problem is always a
representative of the poor. The executive leader always prefers to seek the support
of legislators from this group, since they are "cheaper" to buy. Intuitively, a poor
representative is able to extract more rents out of the same amount of tranfers
and, therefore, requires less resources in order to support the government whenever
x 6= lm. Furthermore, by obtaining the suport of a median poor legislator, the
prime-minister automatically guarantees the votes of all other poor representatives.
This is because the members of the parliament with median preference are always
the ones whose support is most di¢ cult to obtain, given that they control the
appointment of the next government.
The main properties of the equilibrium are summarized in the next lemma.
Lemma 1.2 The equilibrium under a parliamentary system is characterized by the
following properties:
i: The tax rate is always equal to one,  = 1.
ii: The size of transfers is such that '  1   
n
, with strict inequality when
e 6= lm.
iii: The amount of rents extracted by the executive leader is such that se  ,
with strict inequality when e 6= lm.
iv: When the executive leader has type e = H , the distance jx   Lj is
smallest when the median legislator is aligned with the preference of the
poor voters, lm = L.
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In a parliamentary system, the ability to check the executive is delegated to
legislators, who hold the prime-minister accountable through the condence pro-
cedure. This implies that the members of the parliament are in a strong position
to push for higher transfers, which expands their expropriation opportunities at
the local level. The executive leader, in turn, sets the tax rate to its maximum,
both in order to satisfy the demands of legislators and to raise his own rents.
At the same time, the vote of no condence adds exibility to the parliamen-
tary system by providing an institutional mechanism to remove the prime-minister
before the end of the term. A misaligned leader, e 6= lm, must always satisfy the
demands of the parliament to stay in o¢ ce and is forced to accept a reduction
in rents whenever the public policy is distorted away from the median legislators
preference. Formally, the condence requirement imposes that:







where sp () is the amount of rents expropriated by a poor legislator. Observe that
when ex 6= lm, we must have that e' > 1  n and ese < .
Overall, the condence procedure strengthens the bargaining power of the par-
liament considerably. Thus, an important requirement for the parliamentary sys-
tem to perform in accordance with the interests of voters is that the legislators
represent their preferences with high likelihood. In particular, observe that the
vote of no condence works in favor of the poor voters whenever e = H and
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lm = L. Indeed, this is the only case where the condence procedure is actually
used to protect their interests.
1.5. Main Results
This section presents the main results of our analysis. The rst proposition
compares the size of taxes, transfers and political rents under both systems of
government.
Proposition 1.1. From lemmas 1:1 and 1:2, it follows that:
i: The tax rate is higher under parliamentary systems:
 pres   parl = 1
ii: The size of transfers and the provision of local public goods are higher
under parliamentary systems:
'pres  'parl and `presi  `parli ;
with E('pres) < E('parl) and E(`presi ) < E(`
parl
i ).
iii: The expected amount of rents extracted by legislators is larger under par-
liamentary systems:
E(spresl )  E(sparll ),
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with strict inequality if the legislator represents a poor constituency, while
the expected amount of rents obtained by the executive leader is larger
under presidential systems:
E(sprese ) > E(sparle )
Intuitively, the threat of a vote of no condence allows the members of the
parliament to obtain larger transfers to constituencies and, as a result, more rents
for themselves. The existence of direct elections, on the other hand, increases the
ability of voters to inuence policies, which limits the size of transfers, while at
the same time allowing the executive leader, who is given a xed term in o¢ ce, to
extract more rents.
The conclusion that taxes and transfers are smaller under presidential systems
is in line with the theoretical results obtained by Persson, Roland and Tabellini
(2000) as well as with the empirical evidence provided by Persson and Tabellini
(2003, 2004). A novel implication of our analysis is that the size of transfers
under presidential systems is increasing in the quality of institutions available to
the poor. Intuitively, additional transfers are only worth to voters if a reasonable
fraction of the resources is expected to translate into local public goods. This idea
is consistent with Olken (2006) who studied the performance of an anti-poverty
program in Indonesia, showing that the losses from corruption may actually have
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outweighed the intended benets of the transfers. Finally, the result about the
amount of rents expropriated by the executive leader and legislators is similar to
the one obtained by Robinson and Torvik (2009).
The next proposition concerns the quality of the public policies approved under
each regime.
Proposition 1.2 If the number of poor and rich constituencies is such that np >
nr+1 and  = H L is large enough, then there exists a threshold  such that if
   the expected distance between the public policy and the poor voterspreference





The vote of no condence provides additional exibility to the parliamentary
system by allowing legislators to replace a misaligned leader before elections. The
above result shows that the condence procedure translates into better policies for
the poor provided that the probability of post-shock congruence, , is su¢ ciently
large. The intuition is simple. Observe that the median legislators type is deter-
mined by aggregating across many representatives. Thus, when 1
2
<  < 1, the
likelihood that the median legislator is aligned with the poor is larger than that of
any single politician, as "negative shocks" can be cancelled out in the aggregation
process. In this case, the parliament is expected to better represent the interests
of voters than the executive. Finally, to guarantee that the quality of the public
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policies is indeed higher under parliamentary systems,  must be su¢ ciently larger
than 1
2
, so that the median legislator is aligned with enough frequency.
While it is di¢ cult to characterize the precise conditions under which the rich
voters would prefer one regime over the other, it is instructive to analyze two
particular cases. When  = 1, the preferences of the rich and the poor are always
the same, so that the result discussed above applies to both groups. On the other
hand, when  = 0, preferences of the rich and the poor are always di¤erent, so
that they have exactly opposite views about the quality of public policies under
each system.34 Intuitively, then, it should be di¢ cult to reach a consensus about
the form of government in societies where the degree of heterogeneity is very high.
1.5.1. Constitutional Choices
This subsection studies the preferences of voters and politicians over the form of
government. A hypothetical constitutional stage is introduced at the beginning
of the period, before all uncertainty over preferences is realized. It is assumed
that every aspect of the model is common knowledge and that agents know their
future social status or political role in the society. Following Buchanan and Tullock
(1962), we study the issue of constitutional design from a positive point of view.
Our main goal is to investigate the reasons behind the institutional choices of the
various population groups, assuming that, at least in the medium term, citizens




(poor and rich) and o¢ ce-holders (executive leader and legislators) remain in their
respective social and political positions.
The next proposition characterizes the constitutional preferences of o¢ ce-holders.
Proposition 1.3 With respect to the constitutional preferences of o¢ ce-holders:
i: The executive leaders expected utility is always higher under presidential
systems:
E(V prese ) > E(V parle )
ii: There exists  such that if Pr (l = lm)  , then the expected utility of
legislator l is higher under parliamentary systems:
E(V presl ) < E(V
parl
l )
Our analysis underlines the fact that the balance of powers between executive
and legislative is markedly di¤erent under each regime of government. The exec-
utive leader prefers a presidential system, where the certainty of a xed term in
o¢ ce provides an insulation against the checks of voters and the congress. The leg-
islators, on the other hand, tend to prefer a parliamentary system, where the vote
of no condence allows them to exert a more active role in the political process.
Each representative is able to extract more rents and, conditional on belonging to
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the winning coalition, to obtain a better public policy. Therefore, the parliamen-
tary regime is preferred by a legislator if the probability of being aligned with the
median type is su¢ ciently large, Pr (l = lm)  , where the exact threshold 
depends on how much more rents he is able to extract under this system.
We now turn to the constitutional preferences of voters. The next results are
derived under the assumptions required for proposition 1:2. We start by charac-
terizing the conditions under which the poor would prefer each alternative.
Proposition 1.4 (Poor voters) For any given level of income 0 < yp < 1, we have
that :
i: If p and  are small enough, then the expected utility of the poor voters
is higher under presidential systems.
ii: If p and  are large enough, then the expected utility of the poor voters
is higher under parliamentary systems.
The poor voters prefer a presidential system of government whenever the qual-
ity of local institutions, p, is weak and the probability of post-shock congruence,
, is low. In this case, a large fraction of the transfers is diverted by legislators
due to the lack of institutional protection at the local level. Furthermore, pub-
lic policies are expected to be worse under parliamentary systems given that the
median legislator cannot be trusted to represent the voterspreferences with high
likelihood. In this circumstance, it is best for the poor to have the ability to check
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the executive leader through direct elections. This allows them to impose a limit
on the size of taxes and transfers and to demand policies that are more in line with
their own preferences.
Conversely, the parliamentary system is preferred whenever the quality of local
institutions and the probability of post-shock congruence are both large enough.
Overall, our results emphasize that the parliamentarism is the regime that is most
"intensive" in political institutions in that it requires a strong system of protection
against expropriation, particularly at the local level, and a congress that can be
trusted to represent well the interests of voters.
Finally, we compare the constitutional preferences of rich and poor voters,
focusing on the following di¤erence:
(1.17) 
  E(U r;parl   U r;pres)  E(Up;parl   Up;pres);
where U j;k represents the utility of group j 2 fp; rg under the regime k 2 fpres;
parlg. Intuitively, 
 provides a measure of how the relative preference for the par-
liamentary system di¤ers across rich and poor voters. For instance, if 
 > (<) 0,
then the rich prefer the parliamentary regime more (less) than the poor. Further-
more, in order to avoid uninteresting cases, we assume that the incentive compati-
bility constraint on legislators from rich districts is always binding, which guaran-
tees that they obtain strictly positive rents in equilibrium. The next proposition
summarizes our main conclusions.
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Proposition 1.5 (Rich voters)












with strict inequality when E( pres) < 1:
The burden of corruption imposed by legislators is not equally distributed
across the population. The better quality of the local institutions available to
the rich, r > p, allow them to obtain more benets out of the larger transfers re-
ceived under parliamentary systems, which skews their relative preference towards
these regimes. At the same time, the rich voters are also more a¤ected by the
higher taxes levied under parliamentary systems, since yr > yp, which makes the
presidential regime more attractive to them. Interestingly, our results suggest that
income per se cannot account for the fact that the rich citizens in Brazil voted
more for the parliamentary system. Instead, the model highlights that an impor-
tant reason behind this evidence can be attributed to di¤erences in the quality of
local accountability institutions across the population.
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1.6. Conclusion
This paper has studied the main factors that determine the constitutional pref-
erences of citizens over the form of government. We focus on the case of Brazil,
where a referendum in 1993 allowed the population to choose between a presidential
and parliamentary system of government. Using a unique data set consisting of the
results of the referendum, we show that, while the Brazilian population in general
voted more for the presidential system, there exists a strong positive correlation
between income per capita and the percentage of votes cast for the parliamentary
regime in each municipality. We also document that a common reason to reject
the parliamentary system was the absence of direct elections for the executive in
connection with the lack of condence in the congress.
We propose a model to explain the general pattern of the results of the refer-
endum in Brazil. The analysis is based on a fundamental di¤erence between the
two regimes of government: while in presidential systems the executive leader is
directly elected by voters and has a xed term in o¢ ce, in parliamentary systems
the executive leader is appointed by the parliament and may be replaced if receives
a vote of no condence. We show that the parliamentary regime requires a strong
system of protection against expropriation, particularly at the local level, and a
class of politicians that can be trusted to represent well the interests of voters. It
is also shown that the poor groups of the population prefer the presidential system
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because the low quality of their local accountability institutions makes them more
vulnerable to expropriation of rents by legislators.
This paper contributes to the literature on endogenous political institutions by
studying on a particular case of constitutional reform. While we do not contend
that the results of our analysis apply irrespective of the political and institutional
context, we believe that the model highlights some of the key factors involved in
the choice of a regime of government. As pointed out by North (1990), the study of
historical events provides an useful way to identify the main elements behind the
process of institutional change. This paper proposes the use of referendum data
as a valuable source of information about the preferences of citizens on certain
political issues. We believe that a similar approach could be fruitfully applied to
other political institutions given the existence of a vast amount of data on several,
potentially interesting, questions.
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1.7. Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Evolution of Voting Intentions
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Figure 1.2: % of Votes for the Parliamentary System versus Income per
Capita
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Figure 1.3: % of Votes for the Parliamentary System (Valid Votes)
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Figure 1.4: % of Votes for the Parliamentary System versus % of Votes for the
Labor Party
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Figure 1.5: Lack of Information Does Not Account for Stylized Facts
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Figure 1.6: Why not a Parliamentary System? Common Reasons.
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Table 1.1: Referendum: Final Result















































Checks and Balances and Political Transparency
2.1. Introduction
The principle of checks and balances is a cornerstone of modern democracy.
Originally proposed by Montesquieu in his "The Spirit of Laws", it establishes
the idea that the state should be organized in such a way as to allow the dif-
ferent interests represented in it to control and check each other. According to
Madison, an e¤ective system of checks and balances works by so contriving "the
interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by
their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places"
(Federalist Papers, LI, 1788). A well designed structure of checks and balances
provides protection against the abuse of power by o¢ ce-holders and prevents any
single group of the society from unilaterally imposing its interests on others.
However, in spite of the classical arguments in favor of the principle, many
examples can be found where this framework does not seem to perform as well as
it would be to expect. For instance, Linz (1978) and Stepan and Skach (1993) at-
tribute the institutional instability experienced by many Latin American countries
to the political tensions generated by the system of separation of powers adopted
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in these societies. Acemoglu, Robinson and Torvik (2011) also note that recent
proposals to dismantle constitutional checks and balances on the executive have
received strong popular support in several weakly-institutionalized societies such
as Bolivia, Ecuador and, most notably, Venezuela.
Why do checks and balances work well in some cases but not in others? This
paper studies the conditions under which a system of checks and balances is bene-
cial to citizens. In particular, we focus on the fundamental role played by political
transparency, here dened as the ability of voters to observe the proposals submit-
ted to congress during the legislative process. Our analysis shows that transparency
is a necessary, but not su¢ cient, condition for the creation of an e¤ective system
of checks and balances and we identify the circumnstances under which it leads to
better policies in equilibrium. The model yields the surprising result that trans-
parency may be harmful to voters depending on the characteristics of the social
and political environment.
The main intuition is that political transparency allows voters to push their rep-
resentatives to oppose any policy that is contrary to their interests. This increases
the checks on the agenda setter, who is now faced with a stronger opposition in
congress. There are two ways in which this tension may be resolved. First, the
agenda setter may choose to obtain the necessary support for his proposal by sat-
isfying the demands of the opposition, in which case the system of checks and
balances leads to better policies in equilibrium (i.e. less political rents and better
distribution of transfers). Alternatively, the agenda setter may simply choose to
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push his proposal through congress by using political rents to "buy" the support of
legislators against the interests of their constituencies, in which case the system of
checks and balances leads to a "perverse" equilibrium, where the welfare of voters
is diminished as a result of massive corruption.
The present paper builds on Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000), henceforth
PRT, who combine a legislative bargaining game in the style of Baron and Ferejohn
(1989) with retrospective voting as in Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). Their
framework constitutes an attractive starting point for this study due to its sim-
plicity and tractability. Our analysis identies a particular aspect of their models
structure which can be interpreted as relying on a condition that voters do not
observe the proposals made during the legislative bargaining process. By relax-
ing this assumption, we show that under certain circumstances a well functioning
system of checks and balances can be created even without the division of the
agenda-setting powers.
We consider a model with three groups of voters, each represented in congress
by one legislator. At the beginning of every period, an agenda setter is selected
among representatives to make a policy proposal specifying a common tax rate,
transfers to each group of citizens and political rents to each legislator. The notion
of a formal system of checks and balances is captured by the simple requirement
that policies be approved by a majority of congress. Note that our concept of
checks and balances is di¤erent than the one adopted by Persson, Roland and
Tabellini (1997, 2000) in that we do not require that the agenda-setting power to
66
be split among di¤erent agents. At the end of the period, voters decide whether
to reelect or not their representatives based on their performance in o¢ ce, as in
traditional models of retrospective voting (e.g. Ferejohn [1986]).
We solve the model under two alternative informational regimes. Under no
political transparency, the equilibrium involves all transfers being targeted to the
agenda setters group. As shown by PRT, this remarkable result is a consequence
of the fact that voters in non-agenda-setting constituencies engage in a Bertrand-
style competition to be selected to the winning coalition, which leads both groups
to accept zero transfers in equilibrium. As a result, the agenda setter and his
group of voters are able to approve their policies with little opposition in con-
gress. Indeed, we show that this equilibrium is similar to one which would have
been obtained in a model without any checks and balances, where the agenda set-
ter was allowed to directly implement policies, without being required to obtain
congressional approval for his proposals.
Under political transparency, on the other hand, voters are able to observe the
agenda setters proposal once it is submitted to congress. This allows citizens in
non-agenda-setting groups to compare the proposed policy with the status quo and,
accordingly, to incentivize their legislators to either approve or reject it. Formally,
the optimal voting rule of citizens in these groups is to reelect their representatives
if, and only if, they approve (reject) a policy that is better (worse) than the status
quo. As a consequence, the agenda setter and his voters face a stronger opposition
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in congress and are now required to make some policy concessions, in the form of
transfers or political rents, in order to get their desired legislation through congress.
Our analysis leads to an important insight about the nature of legislative bar-
gaining. Note that, before the proposal is presented to congress, voters in the
non-agenda-setting groups are engaged in a direct competition for a place in the
majority coalition, so that all bargaining power is concentrated in the hands of
the agenda setter. This mechanism is emphasized by Ferejohn (1986) and Persson,
Roland and Tabellini (2000). However, as soon as the proposal is made, and assum-
ing that it is observed by everyone, these same voters move to a bargaining position
which allows them to decide whether to support or not the proposal depending on
how it fares against the status quo. This mechanism is in the foundation of tra-
ditional models of legislative bargaining such as Baron and Ferejohn (1989). The
present study provides a reconciliation between these two extreme views of the
legislative process by highlighting the important role played by transparency in a
representative democracy.
Our model shows that political transparency in connection with a formal system
of checks and balances may lead to two di¤erent types of equilibria depending on
how the disputes among citizens are resolved in society. The increased checks on
the agenda setter and his group of voters may, on the one hand, induce a more
balanced distribution of transfers and a reduction in the amount of political rents
extracted by legislators. On the other hand, it may also lead to an equilibrium
where transfers remain concentrated in the agenda setters group, while political
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rents increase as a result of its use as "grease" to facilitate the approval of policies.
Our analysis shows that this "perverse" equilibrium is more likely to occur when
the status quo is attractive to voters in the opposition, in which case the size
of transfers required to obtain their support is very large, and when legislators
do not place a high value in staying in o¢ ce (i.e. when their discount factor is
low), in which case it is very cheap to "buy" their support against the interests
of their constituencies. Moreover, we argue that any factor that exacerbates the
distributional conict among social groups (e.g. ethnic and religious heterogeneity)
is conducive to such an equilibrium.
The present paper is related to a number of studies that analyze the e¤ect of
the system checks and balances on political and institutional performance. The
notion that checks and balances leads to a reduction in corruption is prevalent
in the political economy literature (Persson, Roland and Tabellini [1997, 2000],
Glaeser and Goldin [2004] and Besley, Persson and Reynal-Querol [2011]). Indeed,
several papers provide support for the existence of such a relationship in the data,
both across countries (La Porta et al. [2004]) and across states within a country
(Alt and Lassen [2008] and Alston et. al. [2010]). The present paper adds to this
literature by providing a formal framework to study the conditions under which a
well functioning system of checks and balances is to be expected.
Our result that checks and balances may lead to an increase in the size of polit-
ical rents in equilibrium may be viewed as suprising in some senses. Nonetheless,
it is consistent with the observation that such systems often do not work well in
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practice. Acemoglu, Robinson and Torvik (2011), for instance, argue that con-
stitutional checks and balances may result in worse policies for voters by making
politicians "cheaper" to be bribed by the members of an organized elite. The
present paper provides an alternative view on this issue, emphasizing the impor-
tance of the interaction between transparency and the political environment on
the way in which checks and balances operate in practice.
Our study is also connected to a literature on the e¤ect of transparency on
political outcomes. A number of recent papers have highlighted the fact that more
information is not always benecial to voters (Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts
[2001], Maskin and Tirole [2004], Prat [2005] and Fox and Van Weelden [2011]).
The main idea is that transparency may induce politicians to pander to the pub-
lic, in which case they simply ignore potentially valuable private information in
order to choose policies that are in accordance with the votersprior beliefs. The
present analysis adds to this literature by showing that political transparency, in
the context of a model of representative democracy with checks and balances, is
not necessarily optimal for voters. The mechanism behind our result is novel and
emphasizes the fact that information about the legislative process exacerbates ex-
isting conicts in the society, which may lead to an increase in corruption whenever
political rents are used to push legislation through congress.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2:2 introduces the
basic setup of the model and discusses its main assumptions. Section 2:3 solves
for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the model with and without political
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transparency. Section 2:4 presents the main results of the paper and section 2:5
concludes.
2.2. Model
The basic set-up follows Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000). Their frame-
work combines legislative bargaining in the style of Baron and Ferejohn (1989)
with a model of innitely repeated elections, where voters hold their representa-
tives accountable for their past performance, as in Ferejohn (1986). We consider a
society with three groups (or districts), i = 1; 2; 3, each composed of a continuum
of identical agents with measure one. The preference of a member of group i in




t kU i (qt) ;
where 0 <  < 1 is the discount factor and qt is the vector of policies implemented
in period t: The per period utility of voters is:
(2.2) U i (qt) = 1   t + f it ;
where  t is a common tax rate and f it is the amount of transfers received by
members of i:
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Each group is represented in congress by one legislator, l = i = 1; 2; 3, with







where lt is an indicator variable that equals to unity if the agent holds o¢ ce in
period t and zero otherwise. The per period utility of legislators is:
(2.4) V l (qt) = slt;
where slt denotes the amount of political rents expropriated by l.
The policy vector is given by qt = [ t; ff itg ; fsltg] and must satisfy the budget
constraint:








Each representative is held accountable by members of his own group. It is
assumed that legislators cannot commit to policy platforms prior to elections. This
creates a moral hazard problem in that, once elected, they will have an incentive to
expropriate rents as much as possible. In this context, voters are able to discipline
their representatives only "retrospectively", by threatening not to reelect them
at the end of the period. We assume that an incumbent who does not receive
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the support of a majority of citizens in his group is replaced by a candidate with
identical preferences and may never return to o¢ ce again.
In each period, an agenda setter a is selected with equal probability among
legislators and given the responsibility to make a proposal eq = [e ; f ef ig; feslg],
specifying all elements of the policy vector. The proposal is, then, submitted to
congress, where it can be either approved or rejected. A proposal is implemented
if supported by at least one legislator other than the agenda setter; otherwise, a
default policy qo is put in place, with  o = f o + so, f o  0 and so =   0: Voters
observe the role of each legislator in congress as well as the vector of implemented
policies. At the end of the period, they decide whether to reelect or not their
representatives.
The notion of a formal system of checks and balances is captured by the re-
quirement that policies be approved by a majority of legislators in order to be
implemented. This structure prevents any representative from unilaterally impos-
ing his interests on others, as policy-making requires joint agreement among them.
Observe that this view of checks and balances is di¤erent from the one adopted
by Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997, 2000) in that we do not require that
the agenda-setting power be split among di¤erent legislators. Indeed, the condi-
tion that the agenda setter approves legislation in congress is compatible with any
distribution of authority over the agenda.
To summarize, the timing of the events is as follows:
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(1) Nature randomly selects an agenda setter a among legislators.
(2) The agenda setter proposes a vector of policies eq.
(3) Congress votes. If at least one legislator other than the agenda setter
supports the proposal, then it is implemented. Otherwise, a default policy
qo is adopted, with f o  0 and so =   0.
(4) Elections are held.
A strategy for citizens is a retrospective voting rule, which species the con-
ditions under which an incumbent legislator will receive their support at the time
of elections. Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) suppose that citizens in each
group commit to a voting strategy at the beginning of the period, after the insti-
tutional role of their representatives is realized and observed by all. Specically, it
is assumed that voters are unable to re-optimize their strategies at any subsequent
stage of the game, even after new information about policies becomes available.
The implicit assumption is that all actions taken during the legislative period, i.e.
stages (2) and (3), are not observed by citizens, which guarantees that there is
no incentive for them to re-optimize their strategies at these points. Furthermore,
note that, once policies have been implemented, voters are indi¤erent between re-
electing their representative or substituting him for another candidate, since both
are identical by assumption. Therefore, they have no reason to re-optimize their
strategies just before elections as well.
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The present analysis highlights the importance of information about the leg-
islative process, particularly the ability of voters to observe the agenda setters
proposal. We consider the impact of two informational regimes on the e¤ectiveness
of the system of checks and balances. First, under no political transparency, voters
are unable to observe what occurs inside congress and the legislative process is a
"black box". This situation corresponds to the case studied by PRT (section III)
and serves as a benchmark for our analysis. Second, under political transparency,
voters observe the agenda setters proposal and are allowed to re-optimize their
strategies conditional on this new information. Intuitively, the notion of trans-
parency adopted in our model captures, in a reduced-form fashion, the formal
rules regulating the policy-making process, the presence of a free press as well as
the degree of political awareness of the population. Our main goal is to compare
the quality of the implemented policies under these two cases.
2.3. Equilibrium
This section characterizes the equilibrium of the model under the two informa-
tional regimes described above. The analysis focuses on the set of stationary equi-
libria, where players are restricted to condition their strategies only on information
available in the same period. Subsection 2:3:1 studies the case without political
transparency, while subsection 2:3:2 analyzes the case with political transparency.
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2.3.1. No Political Transparency
We start by characterizing the equilibrium of the model when the o¢ ce-holders
actions are not observed. In this case, the reelection strategies formulated by voters
at the beginning of the period are credible, given that no additional information
is released until the vector of implemented policies is observed. Under no political
transparency, the voting rules of citizens are made contingent on the institutional
role of their representatives and specify reappointment if, and only if, the utility
associated with the policy outcome q exceeds a certain threshold bi:
(2.6) i (q) = 1 i¤ Ui (q)  bi
where bi is set simultaneously by voters in each group.
We solve the stage game of the model for a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium. Proceeding by backward induction, we start by characterizing the optimal
strategies of legislators. First, representatives m and n observe the agenda setters
proposal eq and decide whether to approve or reject it, taking into account the
strategies of voters in their groups. Formally, it is (weakly) dominant for them to
approve a proposal eq if, and only if,
(2.7) esi + i(eq)W   + i (qo) W;
where W is the expected continuation value of legislators.1
1Observe that this a strictly dominant strategy conditional on the legislator being pivotal.
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The agenda setter, then, takes as given the optimal strategies of legislators
m and n and decides which policy to propose. Observe that it is optimal for
him to form a minimum winning coalition, setting fe = se = 0 for the excluded
group e, and to seek the support of the legislator whose approval is cheapest to
obtain. Formally, the agenda setter proposes a policy eq that maximizes his utility
according to the following problem:
(2.8) maxe;f efig;fesig esa + a(eq)W
s:t:
8><>:
ef + es  3e (BC)
esi + i(eq)W   + i (qo) W (ICi)
Next, voters simultaneously choose their reelection strategies. For any voting
rule of citizens in the agenda setters group, members of m and n compete with
each other to be part of the winning coalition. PRT show that this competition
leads to an equilibrium where both groups demand zero transfers, fm = fn = 0,
and their reservation utilities are set at bm = bn = 1    . The intuition for this
result is akin to the Bertrand model of price competition: each groupsdesire to
be included in the winning coalition leads voters to undercut each other up to the
point where transfers to both districts are zero.
Lemma 2.1 (PRT) In equilibrium, fm = fn = 0 and bm = bn = 1   :
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Hence, the agenda setter is indi¤erent between which representative to choose
as coalition partner. Suppose that m is selected. Notice that when bm = 1   , the
legislator is always reelected, even when the status quo is implemented. Therefore,
it follows from (2:7) that it is a dominant strategy for him to approve a proposal
eq if, and only if:
(ICm) esm  
Finally, voters in the agenda setters group choose their reservation utility ba;
taking as given the optimal strategies of legislators and voters in other districts.
Observe that the agenda setter has always the option to give up reelection and
propose a policy that maximizes his own utility subject to the approval of legislator
m, in which case we have  0 = 1; s0m =  and s
0
a = 3   . Thus, the incentive
compatibility constraint on a must be such that:
(ICa) esa + W  3  ,
which guarantees that, in equilibrium, the agenda setter always prefers to pursue
reelection rather than to implement his outside option. Hence, voters in group a
choose their reelection strategies so as to maximize their utility according to the
following problem:
(2.9) ba  max
;ffig;fsig




f + s  3 (BC)
sa + W  3   (ICa)
sm   (ICm)





From (ICa) and (ICm), it follows that the aggregate incentive compatibility
constraint on o¢ ce-holders is given by:
(2.11) s  3  W
At the optimum, this expression must hold with equality, so that the continuation
value of legislators is given byW = 3
3 2 and the total amount of rents expropriated
is:
(2.12) s = 3
3  3
3  2
Furthermore, it is optimal for voters in a to set taxes to its maximum level,  = 1,





The next proposition summarizes the main properties of the equilibrium under
no political transparency.
Proposition 2.1Without political transparency, the unique stationary equilibrium



















All legislators are reelected :
Observe that these results are the same as those that would have been obtained
in a model without checks and balances, where the agenda setter was allowed to
directly implement policies, without being required to get congressional approval
for his proposals. Notice that, in this case, the incentive compatibility constraint
on legislator a would be given by:
(2.14) sa + W  3,
which captures the fact that the agenda setter is now able to keep all resources
for himself when he decides not to pursue reelection. Moreover, observe that
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representatives m and n would always get zero rents in equilibrium, sm = sn = 0,
since they do not perform any role in this case. Thus, voters in the agenda setters
district would choose their reelection strategies so as to maximize their utility
subject to the budget and the incentive compatibility constraint on legislator a:
(2.15) ba  max
;ffig;fsig
1   + fa
s:t:
8><>: f + s  3 (BC)sa + W  3 (ICa)
This problem yields the same results as those derived in proposition 2:1, except
that all rents are expropriated by the agenda setter, i.e. s = sa = 33 33 2 . There-
fore, under no political transparency, the requirement that policies be approved in
congress is inconsequential for the equilibrium and the system of checks and bal-
ances is ine¤ective in this case. Observe that this result follows from the agenda
setters ability to play the members of m and n against each other, so that he is,
in e¤ect, able to get policies through congress without any opposition. The next
proposition summarizes this novel insight of our analysis.
Proposition 2.2 The system of checks and balances is ine¤ective without political
transparency.
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997, 2000) argued that an e¤ective system of
checks and balances can be created by separating the agenda setting power among
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di¤erents agents. This paper complements their analysis by focusing, instead, on
the informational aspect of the problem. In particular, we show that political
transparency may, under certain circumnstances, lead to a well functioning system
of checks and balances.
2.3.2. Political Transparency
We now proceed to analyze the model under political transparency. The main
di¤erence in this case is that voters are able to re-optimize their strategies after
the agenda setters proposal eq is observed. This feature "breaks" the Bertrand
competition between voters in districts m and n, given that the strategies required
to support it as an equilibrium are no longer credible. As a consequence, political
transparency increases the opposition faced by the agenda setter and voters in his
district. Intuitively, citizens in m and n are now able to condition their strategies
on the proposal eq, which allows them to push their representatives to oppose any
policy that is worse than the status quo, qo.
We solve the stage game of the model for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proceeding by backward induction, we start by analyzing the optimal strategies
of legislators m and n; after a policy eq is proposed and observed by all. Each
representative i = m;n is subjected to a voting rule, i (eq; vi) 2 f0; 1g ; which
species whether he is reelected or not conditional on his vote on the proposal,
vi 2 f0; 1g : In order to rule out some uninteresting cases where both legislators
approve a policy against their own interests, we assume that o¢ ce-holders always
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behave as if they were pivotal. Thus, given voters reelection strategies, it is
dominant for legislator i to support the proposal, vi = 1, if, and only if:
(2.16) esi + i (eq; 1) W   + i (eq; 0) W
After observing the agenda setters proposal eq, voters in districts i = m;n
simultaneously choose their reelection strategies, i (eq; vi). Notice that it is in their
interest to have a proposal implemented if, and only if, Ui (eq)  Ui (qo) = 1   ,
in which case it is optimal for them to incentivize their representatives to approve
it. A similar reasoning applies to the opposite situation, where Ui (eq) < Ui (qo) =
1 , in which case voters would want their representatives to reject the proposal.
The optimal reelection strategy of citizens in district i is, therefore, given by:
(2.17)
i (eq; 1) = 1 and i (eq; 0) = 0 if Ui (eq)  1  
i (eq; 1) = 0 and i (eq; 0) = 1 if Ui (eq) < 1  
that is, a legislator i is reelected if, and only if, he (i) votes in favor of a proposal
that is better than the status quo (from the point of view of his voters) or (ii)
rejects a proposal that is worse than the status quo.
Moving backwards, the agenda setter anticipates the optimal behavior of voters
and legislators in districts m and n and proposes a policy eq that maximizes his
utility subject to the budget constraint and the approval of at least one legislator,
saym, taking as given the reelection strategies of voters in his own district, a (eq) 2
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f0; 1g. Formally, we have:
(2.18) eq 2 argmax
feslg;f efig;e esa + a (eq) W
s:t:
8><>:
ef + es  3e (BC)
esm + m (eq; 1) W   + m (eq; 0) W (ICm)
Observe that the agenda setter has two ways in which to satisfy the incentive
compatibility constraint on legislator m:
A: First, he may propose a policy eq such that Um (eq) = 1  , in which case
m (eq; 1) = 1 and m (eq; 0) = 0, i.e. legislator m is reelected if, and only
if, he approves the proposal, so that the incentive constraint on m can be
re-expressed as:
(ICAm) esm + W  
B: Second, he may propose a policy eq such that Um (eq) = 0; in which case
m (eq; 1) = 0 and m (eq; 0) = 1, i.e. legislator m is reelected if, and only
if, he rejects the proposal, so that the incentive constraint on m can be
re-expressed as:
(ICBm) esm   + W
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Accordingly, there are two basic options available to the agenda setter when
he decides not to pursue reelection: he may either (1) propose a policy q01 such
that Um (q01) = 0, with  01 = 1, f 01m = 0, s
01
m =  + W and s
01
a = 3   ( + W ),
or (2) propose a policy q02 such that Um (q02) = 1   , with  02 = 1, f 02m = 1   ,
s02m =   W and s02a = 2+ W . As a result, the incentive compatibility constraint
on the agenda setter may assume one of the following forms:
(IC1a) sa + W  3  ( + W )| {z }
s01a
or
(IC2a) sa + W  2 + W| {z }
s02a
! sa  2
depending on which of the alternatives turns out to be best for him.
Finally, voters in the agenda setters district choose their reelection strategies,
taking as given the optimal behavior of legislators and citizens in other districts.
The voting rule is made conditional on the agenda setters proposal eq and is given
by:
(2.19) a (eq) = 1 i¤ Ua (eq)  ba
As before, the utility threshold ba is chosen so as to maximize the votersutility
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint on the agenda setter and the
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condition for congressional approval. At the optimum, voters choose between two
types of strategies:
i: First, they may design their voting rules so as to induce the agenda setter
to propose a policy eq such that Um (eq) = 1 ; in which case the incentive
constraint on legislator m is esm + W  , as expressed above in  ICAm :
ii: Second, they may design their voting rules so as to induce the agenda
setter to propose a policy eq such that Um (eq) = 0; in which case the






Formally, the equilibrium may fall in one of four di¤erent categories, each
characterized by:
(2.20) ba  maxfslg;ffig; 1   + fa
s:t: f + s  3 (BC)
subject to the following additional constraints:
 Case A:1 : 8>>>><>>>>:




sa + W  3  ( + W ) (IC1a)
Um (eq)  1  
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 Case A:2 : 8>>>><>>>>:




sa  2 (IC2a)
Um (eq)  1  




sa + W  3  ( + W ) (IC1a)




sa  2 (IC1a)
Intuitively, voters in district a face a trade-o¤ between transfering resources to
citizens in m (cases A:1 and A:2) and providing extra rents to legislator m (cases
B:1 and B:2), taking into account that representative m is not be reelected in
the latter case. The next proposition characterizes the stationary subgame-perfect
equilibrium for all possible parameter values.
Proposition 2.3 Under political transparency, the unique stationary equilibrium
is characterized by the following policies:
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i: If   3 3
7  ; then the equilibrium falls into case B:1 and is characterized












The continuation value of legislators is given by WB:1 = 3
3  and only the
representatives from districts a and n are reelected.
ii: If 3 3











, then the equilibrium falls
into case B:2 and is characterized by the following policies:
B:2 = 1
sB:2 = (2 + )
3  2
3  3
fB:2a = 3  (2 + ) 3 23 3 and fB:2m = fB:2n = 0
The continuation value of legislators is given by WB:2 = 2+
3 3 and only the













   1 
2
; then the equilibrium falls
into case A:1 and is characterized by the following policies:
A:1 = 1
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sA:1 = 3 (1  )
fA:1a = 3   (1  ) and fA:1m = 1  ; fA:1n = 0
The continuation value of legislators is given by WA:1 = 1 and all repre-
sentatives are reelected.
iv: If   1 
2
; then the equilibrium falls into case A:2 and is characterized
by the following policies:
A:2 = 1






m = 1  ; fA:2n = 0
The continuation value of legislators is given by WA:2 = 2+
3 2 and all
representatives are reelected.
Figure 2:1 illustrates the region of the parameters where each class of equilib-
ria can be obtained. Observe that the equilibrium of "type A" occurs when the
values of  (status quo rents) and  (discount factor) are su¢ ciently large. This
corresponds to a situation where the default policy is not attractive to citizens,
i.e. Ui (qo) = 1    is low, in which case it is relatively cheap for the agenda
setter to obtain the support of voters in the opposition. Moreover, when  is large,
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legislators place a signicant value in staying in o¢ ce, so that it is expensive to
buy their vote against the interests of their constituents.
The next proposition shows that the aggregate amount of rents is smaller and
the distribution of transfers more equitable when the equilibrium falls into cases
A:1 and A:2.
Proposition 2.4 Under political transparency, we have that:
i: The aggregate amount of rents is smaller when the equilibrium belongs to
cases A:1 and A:2:
sA < sB
ii: The size of transfers received by voters in district m is larger when the




Figures 2:2 and 2:3 illustrate these results graphically by showing how the
amount of rents expropriated in equilibrium vary as a function of the parameters
 and , respectively. Observe the existence of a sharp drop in political rents as
one moves from a "type-B" to a "type-A" equilibrium. At this point, voters in
the agenda setters district are exactly indi¤erent between these two alternatives,
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since the observed reduction in rents is o¤set by an equivalent increase in the size
of transfers to citizens in m.
2.4. Main Results
This section compares the equilibria of the model with and without political
transparency. Our goal is to derive conditions under which transparency is welfare
improving for citizens. The main result is stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 2.5. From the results derived in propositions 2:1 and 2:3, it follows
that:
i: If, under political transparency, the equilibrium belongs to cases A:1 and
A:2, then:
sT < sNT and fTm > f
NT
m = 0
ii: If, under political transparency, the equilibrium belongs to cases B:1 and
B:2, then:
sT > sNT and fTm = f
NT
m = 0
That is, political transparency leads to an improvement in the quality of poli-
cies, i.e. less rents and better distribution of transfers, provided that the equilib-
rium falls into category "A". Our analysis underlines the fact that the interaction
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between transparency and checks and balances may result in two markedly di¤erent
outcomes. While political transparency always leads to an increase in the oppo-
sition faced by the agenda setter and his group of voters, the mechanism through
which this conict is resolved depends on the political and social environment.2
Intuitively, voters in the agenda setters district may obtain the necessary support
for their policies by either reaching a compromise with citizens in the opposition
or by simply using political rents to push legislation through congress.
The rst result is in line with the classical notion that checks and balances are
always benecial to the society, as argued by Montesquieu and Madison. Giving
veto power to the opposition makes it more di¢ cult for any particular group to
impose their interests on others and, at the same time, restricts the ability of o¢ ce-
holders to extract rents. Our analysis complements this traditional view by showing
that, under some circumstances, checks and balances and political transparency
may actually lead to a "perverse" equilibrium, where political rents increase and
transfers remain concentrated on a minority of voters. We show that this situation
is more likely to occur in societies where (i) the status quo is favorable to voters
in the opposition and (ii) legislators do not attach much value to staying in o¢ ce.
2Interestingly, our result is related to Dahl (1956)s argument on the importance of "social checks
and balances", i.e. consensus on certain norms and values, for the performance of institutional
checks and balances. According to him, "in the absence of certain social prerequisites, no con-
stitutional arrangements can produce a non-tyrannical republic".
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Proposition 2.6. Voters are better o¤ (in expected terms) under political trans-
parency if, and only if, the equilibrium belongs to cases A:1 and A:2:
Observe that, under an equilibrium of type "B", voters would actually benet
from a transition to a regime without political transparency or, equivalently, to
a system without checks and balances (as discussed in proposition 2:2). This
would, at least, make the support of legislators "cheaper" to buy, thus leading
to a reduction in the overall political rents. Interestingly, our results provide an
alternative explanation to Acemoglu, Robinson and Torvik (2011) as to why voters
would want to dismantle a system of constitutional checks and balances.
2.5. Conclusion
This paper has studied the conditions under which a system of checks and
balances is benecial to citizens. We analyze this question in the context of a formal
model where the notion of checks and balances is captured by the requirement
that policies be approved by a majority of congress. Our study emphasizes the
important role played by political transparency, here dened as the ability of voters
to observe the proposals that are submitted to congress during the legislative
process.
We show that, without political transparency, voters in the non-agenda-setting
groups engage in a Bertrand-style competition in order to be included in the "win-
ning coalition". As a result, the agenda setter and his group of voters are able to
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obtain approval for their policies with little opposition in congress. Under political
transparency, on the other hand, citizens observe the agenda setters proposal and
are able to decide whether to support it or not depending on how it compares with
the status quo. As a consequence, the agenda setter and his voters face a stronger
opposition in congress and are now required to make some policy concessions in
order to get their legislation approved.
Intuitively, political transparency exacerbates the conict among di¤erent so-
cial groups by increasing the checks on the agenda setter. There are two ways in
which this tension may be resolved in the society. First, the agenda setter and his
group of voters may choose to obtain the necessary support for their policies by
satisfying the demands of the opposition, in which case the system of checks and
balances leads to a better distribution of transfers and to less political rents in
equilibrium. Alternatively, the agenda setter and his voters may simply choose to
push their proposal through congress by using political rents to "buy" the support
of legislators against the interests of their constituencies, in which case transfers
remain concentrated with the agenda setters group and political rents increase.
We show that such "perverse" equilibrium is more likely to occur when the status
quo is attractive to the opposition and when legislators do not place a high value
in staying in o¢ ce.
The present analysis could be extended in a number of directions. First, it
would be interesting to consider the implications of the model in an environment
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where heterogeneity across social groups (e.g. income inequality and ethnic con-
ict) was explicitly incorporated into the framework (Bandiera and Levy [2011]).
Second, the basic model could be used to analyze whether the introduction of
certain constitutional measures, e.g. a restriction on how transfers should be dis-
tributed across groups, would help to improve the e¤ectiveness of checks and bal-
ances. Third, the analysis could be made more realistic by exploring the role of
pork barrel spending, instead of political rents, as the means of obtaining legislative
support in congress (Drazen and Ilzetzki [2011]). Fourth, it would be interesting
to consider a dynamic version of the model where the status quo was allowed to be
endogenously determined by previous policies (Baron [1996], Kalandrakis [2004],
Bernheim, Rangel and Rayo [2006] and Nunnari [2011]). Fifth, our analysis leads
to novel theoretical predictions that could be tested using appropriate data. We
plan to explore these possibilities in our future research.
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2.6. Figures
Figure 2:1: Classes of Equilibria
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Figure 2:2: Political Rents as a Function of 
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Figure 2:3: Political Rents as a Function of 
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CHAPTER 3
Public versus Secret Voting in Committees
3.1. Introduction
Committee decision-making is a central element of many political and economic
organizations, including governments, legislative bodies and private companies. A
common view in the literature is that group decision-making provides an e¢ cient
way to aggregate disperse information and to mitigate the interference of individual
biases in the decision.1 The issues confronted by committees are often complex
and involve a variety of specic interests. Moreover, there are many situations
in which the interests of its members may not be aligned with the goals of the
organization as a whole. Consider, for instance, the case of a company deciding
whether to downsize a particular division, legislators voting on an electoral reform
(which may be harmful or benecial to some of them) or an academic department
deciding which candidate to hire.
This paper studies a committee decision-making problem with career-oriented
agents who may be biased towards one of the available alternatives. We focus,
1See Li and Suen (1999) and Gerling et al. (2005) for reviews of this literature.
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in particular, on the impact of transparency on the decisions made by the com-
mittee. Our main question is whether the individual votes of members should be
made public or not, i.e. whether voting should be transparent or secret. A num-
ber of papers in the literature have shown that transparency may lead to worse
outcomes by creating an incentive for agents to distort their behavior in order to
convey information about their types (see, for instance, Morris [2001], Maskin and
Tirole [2004] and Prat [2005]). Stasavage (2004), Levy (2007) and Gersbach and
Hahn (2008) obtain similar results in the context of decision-making in commit-
tees. Specically, Levy (2007) shows that transparency induces agents to vote too
much against the prior (i.e. the ex-ante more likely alternative) in order to signal
that they have accurate information about the state of the world.
The main innovation of our paper with respect to the previous literature is
to consider an environment where agents are heterogenous in two dimensions,
competence and preferences. We investigate how the interaction between career
concerns and bias a¤ects the behavior of members and how this e¤ect depends
on transparency. Our analysis highlights that the desire to accumulate reputation
for making correct decisions leads to qualitatively di¤erent implications depending
on the agents competence level and the magnitude of the bias term relative to
the common value. Specically, we show that, for high degrees of bias, reputation
concerns act to "correct" the vote of competent members who otherwise would
have simply voted according to their personal interests; while, for low degrees of
bias, these same concerns induce the incompetent members to vote for their biases,
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even though they would otherwise have preferred to abstain. Intuitively, when the
common value is su¢ ciently large, it is optimal for the uninformed members to
abstain, since by doing so they "delegate" the decision to the competent agents.
Note, however, that such behavior a¤ects their reputation negatively, since ab-
stentions are always viewed as evidence of low ability. This creates an incentive
for the incompetent members to vote and, when they do so, they always choose
the alternative towards which they are biased. Interestingly, therefore, our model
generates the result that career concerns may actually exacerbate the pre-existing
biases of incompetent members.
We, therefore, show that public voting may lead to better results when the mag-
nitude of the bias is large relative to the common value, in which case transparency
helps to mitigate the inuence of private interests on the decisions. Conversely,
secret voting perform may better when the intensity of the bias is relatively small,
in which case the non-observability of individual votes reduces the incentives for
uninformed members to vote just in order to avoid revealing their incompetence.
The model generates detailed predictions about the parameter regions where secret
and public voting are expected to lead to di¤erent outcomes and how transparency
should a¤ect the behavior of each of type agent, even though more work is still
needed in order to ascertain how the existence of multiple equilibria a¤ects our re-
sults. We also discuss possible ways in which these theoretical implications could
be tested in a laboratory experiment, which we plan to conduct in future work.
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The present paper is related to a number of studies in the literature that have
compared the performance between public and secret voting in committees. Levy
(2007) and Gersbach and Hahn (2008a) examine models where agents care about
acquiring a reputation for competence. They show that secret voting leads to bet-
ter decisions by reducing distortions arising from signaling considerations. Gers-
bach and Hahn (2004) and Stasavage (2004), on the other hand, analyze a setting
where committee members may be misaligned with the interests of society, but
also care about being perceived as "unbiased" to the extent that this enhances
their reelection prospects. They show that transparency is optimal in this case,
since it induces agents to act in accordance with the public interest. The main
distinction of our analysis with respect to these papers is that we consider a model
where agents are both biased and care about building a reputation for high abil-
ity. We study how these elements interact with each other without imposing that
individual biases per se are punished by the principal.
Other interesting papers in the committee decision-making literature include
Gersbach and Hahn (2008b), who show that transparency induces agents to exert
more e¤ort in order to improve their chances of reappointment, Dal Bo (2007) and
Felgenhauer and Gruner (2008), who argue that public voting makes the committee
more vulnerable to the inuence of special interest groups, and Visser and Swank
(2007), who point out that reputational concerns create an incentive for committees
to conceal internal disagreements and show a united front in public.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3:2 describes the
model and its main assumptions. Section 3:3 solves for the equilibrium under
public and secret voting and section 3:4 presents the main results of the paper.
Section 3:5 discusses some implications for a laboratory experiment, while section
3:6 considers possible extensions and directions for future research. Section 3:7
concludes. All formal proofs are collected in appendix C.
3.2. Model
We consider a committee of n  3 members, i 2 f1; :::; ng with n 2 Z+ odd,
which needs to decide between two alternatives, A and B. The state of the world is
given by ! 2 fA;Bg, with prior probability Pr (! = A) = 1
2
. While the true state
is unknown, members may receive an informative signal about it. An agent can
either be competent, ti = c, in which case he receives a perfectly informative signal,
or incompetent, ti = nc, in which case he does not receive any information at all.
We assume that each member knows his own type ti and that the distribution
of agents abilities is common knowledge and given by Pr (ti = c) = . After
observing their private signals, all members decide simultaneously whether to vote
forA orB or to abstain, vi 2 fA;B; ;g. The nal choice, x 2 fA;Bg, is determined
by majority rules and ties are broken randomly.
The committee members care about making the correct decision and they re-
ceive a common value   0 when the nal choice is consistent with the state of
the world, i.e. x = !. Additionally, agents may also be biased towards one of the
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alternatives. For simplicity, we assume that each member is either biased towards
A or B with equal probability (that is, all members are biased in one way or an-
other).2 An agent biased towards  2 fA;Bg, receives additional utility   0
whenever alternative x =  is selected, irrespective of the state of the world.
Moreover, the committee members are also concerned about being perceived as
competent. Formally, we assume the existence of an additional agent, an external
evaluator, who simply updates his beliefs about the competence level of each mem-
ber, conditional on the state of the world, which is always revealed, and any other
information that might be available to him. Specically, we consider two possible
institutional settings: (i) under public voting, the votes of each committee member
are observed, while (ii) under secret voting, only the nal voting outcome (i.e. the
number of abstentions and votes for each alternative) is observed. The posterior
probability that an agent i is competent is, thus, given by ri  Pr (ti = cj!; I),
where ! is the state of the world and I represents the additional information
available, depending on whether the committee is public or secret,  2 fp; sg.
The utility of each committee member i is, therefore, given by:
(3.1) U ;i = r

i + Ifx=!g+ Ifx=g;
where  2 fA;Bg denotes the alternative towards which the agent is biased,
 2 fp; sg represents whether the committee is public or secret,  is a parameter
2The main qualitative results of the model would remain unchange even if we allowed for the
existence of "independent" types among committee members.
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that measures the importance associated with reputational concerns and Ifg is an
indicator function which equals unity if the condition inside brackets is satised
and zero otherwise.
3.3. Equilibrium
Given our interest in studying the conditions under which transparency leads to
better decisions, our analysis focuses primarily on the following class of symmetric
equilibrium, which we call competent equilibrium.
Denition 3.1 A competent equilibrium is such that all competent members vote
according to the state of the world.
Thus, in a competent equilibrium all competent agents vote for the "correct" al-
ternative, regardless of their biases. Observe that there are two possible subclasses
of this equilibrium, namely: (i) fully competent equilibrium, where all incompetent
members abstain and (ii) partially competent equilibrium, where all incompetent
members vote for their preferred alternative. In the remainder of this section, we
provide a characterization of the parameter region for which this equilibrium can
be sustained under public (subsection 3:3:1) and secret voting (subsection 3:3:2).
We, then, compare the performance of these two schemes in terms of their potential
to generate correct decisions (section 3:4).
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3.3.1. Public Voting
Suppose, rst, that voting is public, so that the actions of every committee mem-
ber, vi 2 fA;B; ;g, are observable. Note that in a competent equilibria no in-
formed member ever abstains or votes against the state of the world, so that
rpi (vi 6= !) = 0. Furthermore, the reputation associated with a correct vote de-
pends on the incompetent typesbehavior. If these members abstain in equilibrium,
then rpi (vi = !) = 1, i.e. a correct vote fully reveals competence, while if they vote




(1 ) , i.e. reputation is equal
to the expected fraction of competent members among those who vote correctly.
Table 3:1 summarizes the reputation levels associated with each possible strategy
under both types of competent equilibria.
The necessary conditions for the existence of a fully competent equilibrium are
that: (i) all competent members who are biased against the state of the world,
 6= !, prefer to vote correctly rather than to abstain or vote incorrectly and
(ii) all incompetent members prefer to abstain rather than to vote for their pre-
ferred alternative.3 We show that, in equilibrium, these two conditions are given,
respectively, by:4






3Note that the symmetric prior assumption, Pr (! = A) = 12 , guarantees that, conditional on
voting, all incompetent members prefer to vote according to their biases.
4See appendix C for the derivation of these conditions.
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and
(3.3)   (n  1)







Note that, since (n 1)
2+(n 3)  1, the last constraint is always harder to satisfy,
i.e. it is more di¢ cult to induce the incompetent members to abstain rather than
to make the competent members vote correctly. It, then, follows from condition
(3:3) that a fully competent equilibrium can never be supported whenever the
bias term is larger than the common value,  > . Furthermore, it is interesting
to observe that, as the importance attached to reputation concerns, , increases,
it becomes less attractive for the uninformed agents to abstain, given that such
behavior perfectly reveals their incompetence.
Next, we proceed to study the conditions for the existence of a partially com-
petent equilibrium. In this case, the constraints that need to be satised are: (i)
all competent members who are biased against the state of the world,  6= !, must
prefer to vote correctly rather than to abstain or vote incorrectly and (ii) all in-
competent members must prefer to vote for their preferred alternative rather than
to abstain. It is possible to show that the latter condition always holds in this
case. Note that the main reason for an incompetent member to abstain is to avoid
adding "noise" to the decision, which makes it less likely that the correct outcome
is obtained.5 However, given that all other incompetent members are, in any case,
5This idea is in line with Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996)s swing voters curse.
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voting for their preferred alternatives, it becomes optimal for each one of them to
vote as well.
The condition that guarantees that all competent types prefer to vote according
to the state of the world is given by:










As before, this constraint imposes that the bias term, , cannot be too large.
Contrarily to the previous case, however, it is still possible to sustain a partially
competent equilibrium even if  > , provided that  is su¢ ciently large. The
intuition is that reputation concerns create an extra incentive for the competent,
but biased, members to vote for the correct alternative. Thus, an increase in 
tends to make it easier to sustain this class of equilibrium.
The following proposition summarizes the main results of this subsection.
Proposition 3.1 Under public voting, a fully competent equilibrium can be sup-
ported if and only if:
(3.5)   pfull =
(n  1)







while a partially competent equilibrium can be supported if and only if:












2+(n 3)  1, it follows that:
(3.7) pfull < 
p
part
Therefore, whenever a fully competent equilibrium can be sustained, then a par-
tially competent equilibrium can be sustained as well.
Figure 3:1 provides a characterization of the values of the parameters  and
 for which each type of competent equilibrium may occur under public voting,
assuming n = 3,  = 0:5 and  = 2. As derived above, note that the region
where a fully competent equilibrium exists is contained in that where a partially
competent equilibrium can be sustained. Furthermore, there is a mixed strategy
equilibrium where the competent members vote correctly and the incompetent
agents randomize between voting and abstaining if, and only if, both the fully and
the partially competent equilibria can be supported.6 Finally, we observe that if
the parameter values are such that a competent equilibrium does not exist, then it
is always possible to sustain an equilibrium where all agents simply vote according
to their biases. More generally, it is possible to show that such equilibrium, which
we call biased equilibrium, can be sustained whenever   :
6Intuitively, the equilibrium structure in this region is similar to that of a simple coordination
game, where all incompetent members either vote, abstain or mix between these two.
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3.3.2. Secret Voting
Now, suppose that voting is secret, so that only the aggregate number of absten-
tions and votes for each alternative are observed. In this case, the reputation of
each agent is identical across members and corresponds to the expected level of
competence in the committee. As discussed above, in a competent equilibrium,
no competent member ever abstains or votes against the state of the world, so
that the observation of m incorrect votes or abstentions, i.e. m =
Pn
i=1 Ifvi 6=!g +Pn
i=1 Ifvi=;g, perfectly reveals that there are at least m incompetent individuals in
the committee. Thus, under a fully competent equilibrium, the expected reputa-


































= Pr(vi = !)
=  + 12 (1  ) in a partially competent equilibria.
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Following a similar argument as before, it is possible to show that a necessary
condition for the existence of a fully competent equilibria is given by:
(3.10)   (n  1)










which guarantees that all incompetent members prefer to abstain rather than to
vote for their preferred alternative. The main di¤erence with respect to public
voting (see expression (3:5) above) is that the term , which captures the im-
portance associated with reputation, is now divided by the number of committee
members, n. Intuitively, under secret voting, the impact of an agents vote on his
own reputation is diluted in proportion to the size of the committee, given that
the evaluator is unable to observe the membersindividual actions. Note that this
e¤ect makes it easier to sustain a fully competent equilibrium, since it reduces the
incentive for an incompetent member to vote just in order to avoid being perceived
as uninformed.
Next, we can show that a necessary condition for the existence of a partially
competent equilibrium is given by:












which guarantees that all competent members prefer to vote in accordance with
the state of the world rather than to abstain or vote incorrectly. As before, the
only di¤erence with respect to public voting (see expression (6) above) is that the
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term  is now divided by n. Observe that, in this case, secrecy makes it harder
to sustain a partially competent equilibrium, given that it reduces the agents
exposure to the "checks" of the evaluator. Specically, a competent member who
is biased against the current state of the world now has much less incentive to vote
correctly, since the reputational gains of doing so are diluted across all agents.
The following proposition summarizes the main results of this subsection.
Proposition 3.2 Under secret voting, a fully competent equilibrium can be sup-
ported if and only if:
(3.12)   sfull =
(n  1)










while a partially competent equilibrium can be supported if and only if:












2+(n 3)  1, it follows that:
(3.14) sfull < 
s
part
Therefore, whenever a fully competent equilibrium can be sustained, then a par-
tially competent equilibrium can be sustained as well.
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Figure 3:2 provides a characterization of the values of the parameters  and
 for which each type of competent equilibrium may occur under secret voting,
assuming n = 3,  = 0:5 and  = 2. As before, it is possible to show that there is
a mixed strategy equilibrium where the competent members vote correctly and the
incompetent agents randomize between voting and abstaining if, and only if, both
types of competent equilibria can be supported. Moreover, it is always possible to
sustain a biased equilibrium, where agents simply vote according to their biases,
whenever   .
3.4. Main Results
We now present the main comparative results of our analysis, focusing on the
parameter regions where each type of competent equilibria can be sustained under
public and secret voting. The next proposition presents our main conclusions.
Proposition 3.3 If   , then it follows that:
i: A fully competent equilibria can never be sustained.
ii: Whenever a partially competent equilibria exists under secret voting, then
it is also exists under transparent voting, i.e. ppart > 
s
part.
If, in turn,  < , then it follows that:
i: A partially competent equilibria can always be sustained.
ii: Whenever a fully competent equilibria exists under public voting, then it




Our analysis shows that whenever the bias term is large relative to the common
value,   , then the uninformed agents can never be expected to abstain in a
competent equilibrium, given that voting allows them to both push the decision
towards their preferred alternative and to obtain higher reputation rewards in
expectation. Furthermore, in this case, the existence of reputation concerns help
to counter-balance the e¤ect of the bias term by inducing the competent agents to
vote correctly in order to signal their ability. Thus, when   , the parameter
region where a partially competent equilibrium can be sustained is larger under
public voting, so that transparency can be expected to result in better decisions
by the committee.
On the other hand, we also show that if the common value is large relative to
the bias term,  < , then it is always possible to support a partially competent
equilibrium. Intuitively, in this case, it is advantageous for a competent member to
vote according to the state of the world both because the common value is dominant
and the reputation associated with a correct vote is larger. Furthermore, observe
that even though all committee members agree that the best decision is x = !, the
existence of reputation concerns creates an incentive for the incompetent agents
to vote according to their biases, since abstaining perfectly reveals their type.
As a result, the parameter region where a fully competent equilibrium can be
sustained is smaller under public voting. It is interesting to note that, in this
case, transparency acts in such a way as to exacerbate the incompetent agents
pre-existing biases, leading to worse decisions by the committee.
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Figure 3:3 summarizes the main aspects of our results. It shows that the impact
of transparency on the quality of committee decisions depends on the size of the
bias relative to the common value. Specically, a partially competent equilibrium
can be sustained under public but not under secret voting in Region I, where
  , while a fully competent equilibrium can be sustained under secret but not
public voting in Region II, where  < . Furthermore, it is possible to show that
the e¤ect of transparency gets amplied, for better or worse, as the importance of
reputation, , increases. Figure 3:4 shows that Regions I and II get larger as 




part   spart > 0 and @@fppart   spartg > 0 when   
pfull   sfull < 0 and @@fpfull   sfullg < 0 when  < 
Our analysis yields some possibly interesting implications for the design of
committee decision-making rules. The model emphasizes the idea that voting
should be transparent in committees where the decisions are highly subjected to
the inuence of ideological or self-interested motives from the part of its members.
This is often the case in congressional committees and board of directors of large
organizations, where there is usually a diversity of specic interests involved in
each decision. Another example is that of a hiring committee in an academic
department, where members are sometimes biased towards candidates in their own
eld. Conversely, voting should be kept secret when the dissent among members,
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due to individual biases, is relatively small, as in the case of a jury in a criminal
case or a department considering changes in its undergraduate curriculum.
3.5. Testing the Theory: Implications for a Laboratory Experiment
This section discusses how the main implications of our theory could be tested
in a laboratory experiment, which we plan to conduct in future work. A rst basic
result of our analysis is that the probability with which the correct decision is
obtained depends on the parameter values. In particular, the likelihood of a correct
outcome under a fully and a partially competent equilibrium is given, respectively,
by:


























It is, then, possible to show that Pfull > Ppart > Pbias.8 Thus, from a welfare
perspective, the best equilibrium is one in which all competent members vote cor-
rectly and all incompetent members abstain. Figure 3:5 depicts the probabilities
with which we expect to obtain a correct decision for di¤erent regions of the para-
meters  and . Assuming that n = 3,  = 0:5 and  = 2, we have Pfull = 0:94,
Ppart = 0:84 and Pbias = 0:5. Our predictions are summarized in table 2. Note that,
for a given voting rule, the probability of a correct outcome is (weakly) decreasing
in  and (weakly) increasing in .
Another implication of our analysis is that there is a di¤erence among the
values of the parameter where each type of equilibrium can be supported under
secret and public voting. In general, public voting is expected to perform better
when   , while secret voting leads to better outcomes when  < . Assuming
that n = 3,  = 0:5 and  = 2, it is possible to derive even sharper predictions.
Figure 3:6 identies the region of the parameters where the performance of public
and secret voting can be expected to be di¤erent. Table 3:3 provides a summary of
our main predictions: (i) the performance of both voting rules is expected to be the
same in regions A, C, D and F ; (ii) public voting should lead to better outcomes
in region B; and (iii) secret voting is expected to perform better in region E.
Finally, we conclude this section with a brief discussion about the possible
schemes that could be used to reward competence in an experimental setting. A
8See appendix C.4 for a proof of this claim.
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rst alternative would be to assign the role of external evaluator to a participant
whose specic task would be to guess the competence level of each committee
member based on the information available after voting takes place. This would
probably correspond to the experimental design most closely related to our model.
However, given that the task of rewarding competence is quite complex, it is likely
that uncertainty about the evaluators ability to process information could lead
some agents to put less weight on reputation and, as a result, to vote more in
accordance with their own biases.
Alternatively, we could explicitly announce the system of rewards to be applied,
so that the participants could take it as given when choosing their strategies. There
are, in fact, two di¤erent treatments that would be interesting to explore in this
case. Suppose, as before, that n = 3,  = 0:5 and  = 2. The rst option captures
the structure of incentives of a partially competent equilibrium: (i) under public
voting, a participant receives 1:32 in case of a correct vote and zero otherwise;
while (ii) under secret voting, he receives 1:32
3
V c; where V c =
Pn
i=1 Ifvi=!g is the
number of correct votes in the committee.9 The second treatment corresponds to
the structure of rewards of a fully competent equilibrium: (i) under public voting,
a participant receives 2 in case of a correct vote and zero otherwise; while (ii)
under secret voting, he receives 2
3
V c. This approach has the advantage of being
simpler and easier to understand. Furthermore, it could help us to side-step some




potential di¢ culties related to the existence of multiple equilibria in certain regions
of the parameters.
3.6. Discussion and Extensions
In this section, we discuss the main assumptions of the model and possible
directions in which to extend the current framework. Note, rst, that the pos-
sibility of abstentions is an important element of our analysis, since it allows for
more nuanced results about the impact of alternative voting rules on the behav-
ior of incompetent agents. Observe that if abstentions were ruled out, then the
non-informed members would simply vote according to their biases and our inves-
tigation would have to be restricted to the actions of the competent types.
Our basic framework also imposes two symmetry assumptions, namely, that
the prior probability is equal across states and that agents are biased towards each
option with the same probability. These restrictions are imposed for analytical
convenience and guarantee that our conclusions hold regardless of the actual state
of the world. It would be straightforward to extend the current framework in order
to allow for more "asymmetry" and we plan to conduct this analysis in our future
work.
The model could also be extended in order to allow for the occurrence of signals
with intermediate levels of precision. Following Levy (2007), we could assume that
each member i observes a signal si 2 fA;Bg, such that Pr (si = !j!) = ti, where
ti 2 (12 ; 1) represents the agents competence level. Observe that the notion of
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competent equilibria would no longer be applicable in this case. We could, instead,
focus on a class of equilibria where at least some of the most competent members
vote for the alternative which their posterior indicates to be the correct one. We
conjecture that this equilibrium should involve a threshold t 2 [1
2
; 1] such that if
ti  t, then agent i votes according to his signal, while otherwise he votes according
to his bias. Similarly, we could also allow for di¤erent degrees of bias intensities in
order to study, in more detail, how the interaction between competence and bias
a¤ects the committees decisions.
There are other extensions to our basic framework that would be worth to
pursue in future work. Throughout this paper, we have supposed that the external
evaluator perfectly observes the state of the world, an assumption which could be
viewed as extreme in many situations. It would, therefore, be interesting to study
how our conclusions would change if the evaluator had access only to an imperfect
signal about the current state. Furthermore, we could also consider a version of
the model where voters were allowed to choose whether to reelect or not their
representatives based on their perception about the memberscompetence levels
and biases.
3.7. Conclusions
This paper has studied a committee decision-making problem with career ori-
ented agents who may be biased towards one of the alternatives. Our analysis
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highlights that the desire to accumulate reputation for high ability leads to di¤er-
ent implications depending on the agents competence and the magnitude of the
bias term relative to the common value. Specically, we show that: (i) for high de-
grees of bias, reputation concerns act to "correct" the vote of competent members
who otherwise would have simply voted according to their personal interests, while
(ii) for low degrees of bias, these same concerns induce the incompetent members
to vote according to their biases, even though they would otherwise have preferred
to abstain. We conclude that public voting leads to better decisions when the
magnitude of the bias is large relative to the common value, while secret voting
performs better otherwise.
Our model generates detailed predictions about the parameter regions where
secret and public voting are expected to lead to signicantly di¤erent outcomes, as
well as the specic ways in which transparency should a¤ect the behavior of each
type of agent. In our future work, we plan to conduct a laboratory experiment in
order to test the main implications of our theory.
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Figure 3.1: Public Voting
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APPENDIX A
Choosing the Form of Government: Theory and Evidence
From Brazil
A.1. Main Data Sources
This paper explores three main sources of data. First, we use municipal level
data on the results of the referendum obtained from the Supreme Electoral Court
of Brazil (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral [TSE]) and several regional Electoral Courts.
Although part of the information was missing or unavailable, we were still able to
recover data for 4; 178 municipalities, which amounts to 90% of the countrys total
population in 1993. Second, we use data from several opinion surveys conducted by
the Datafolha, an independent research institute, from February to April 1993 con-
taining detailed information about voting intentions and individual characteristics
of a large number of subjects. Finally, data on social and economic characteristics
of Brazilian municipalities referring to the year of 1991 were obtained from the In-
stitute of Applied Economic Research (Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada
[IPEA]).1 Table A:1 reports basic descript statistics for the main variables used in
the analysis.
1This data is available at www.ipeadata.gov.br.
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A.2. Proofs
A.2.1. Proof of Lemma 1.1
The Lagrangian for problem (1:8) can be expressed as:
L = (1  ) yp + 1

`p (')   1
2
(x  L)2    (n'+ se   n)
  

  se + 1
2












   (   1)
where  , , 1, 2,  are the multipliers associated with (ICe), (AP1), (AP2) and




(A.2) `p (') 1 p = n   1
(A.3)  =  
(A.4) (x  L) +  (x  e) + 2 (x  lm) = 0
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The optimal transfers are such that:
(A.5) ' = max f'o; b'g ,
where b' is implicitly determined by `p(b') 1p = n . The multiplier  measures
the marginal cost of taxation. Note that, when the constraint   1 is not binding,
we must have  = y
p
n
, so that `p(b') 1p = yp.
Observe, from equation (A.4), that the public policy x is a weighted average of
the preferences of voters and o¢ ce-holders. The weight attached to the presidents
preference,  > 0, measures the cost of providing him with additional rents, so that
se and x are optimally chosen in order to equalize their marginal rates of return.
From the incentive compatibility constraint, it then follows that political rents are
given by:
(A.6) se = +	(x;) ,
where 	(x;)  1
2
(x  e)2   1fe 6=lmg
2
8
 0. Note that, when   1 is not
binding, we have  = y
p
n
< 1 and the reform x (e; lm) is given by: x (L; L) = L;
x (L; H) =
L+H
2















. Substituting these expressions into 	(x;), we obtain 	(x(L;











Finally, the tax rate is residually determined by  = '+ 1
n
se and must satisfy
  1. Observe that as  = H   L increases, the amount of rents required
to incentivize a misaligned president goes up, so that the constraint   1 must
eventually bind.2 At this point, the marginal cost of taxation,  , rises, leading to
a possible reduction in the size of transfers relative to the solution characterized
in (A.5).3 The public policy is further distorted away from the votersoptimal
position, as the weight attached to the executive leaders preference, , increases.
This, in turn, reduces the amount of rents that must be paid to the president and
helps to relax the constraint   1. 
A.2.2. Proof of Lemma 1.2
At the optimum, the budget constraint must be binding, so that se = n (   ').
The Lagrangian for problem (1:15) can be expressed as:














  n (   ') ;
where  and  are the multipliers associated with (CR) and se  0, respectively,
and sp() is the amount of rents obtained by a legislator from a poor constituency.
2Note that the expressions 	(x(H ; L)) and 	(x(H ; H)) are strictly increasing in  when
 < 1.
3The actual reduction of transfers depends on whether the constraint '  'o is binding or not.
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Observe that the optimal solution always involves setting  = 1. The rst-order
condition with respect to ' yields:
(A.7)  =
n (1 + )
1  p ;
where the multiplier  measures the marginal cost of raising additional rents for a
poor legislator. The rst-order condition with respect to x is given by:
(A.8) (x  e) +  (x  lm) = 0;
so that the public policy is a weighted average of the preferences of the executive
leader and the median legislator. From the condence requirement constraint, it,
then, follows that the size of transfers must be such that:









which implies that '  1   
n
, with strictly inequality when x 6= lm. Finally,
the rents extracted by the prime-minister are residually determined by the budget
constraint, se = n (1  '), and must satisfy se  0.
Observe that when constraint se  0 is not binding, the cost of raising addi-
tional rents for legislators is  = n
1 p , i.e.  = 0, and the implemented public
policy is given by x = e+(n=1 
p)lm
1+(n=1 p) . In this case, the required transfers are such
that ' = 1   
n










e 6= lm : Note that as  = H   L increases, the amount of transfers required
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to compensate legislators for a distortion in the public policy relative to x = lm
goes up, so that se  0 must eventually bind. At this point, the marginal cost of
raising rents for the poor legislators, , increases, which leads to a reduction in
the distance between x and lm. This, in turn, allows for a decrease in the size of
transfers and helps to relax the constraint se  0. 
A.2.3. Proof of Proposition 1.1
The result that  pres   parl = 1 follows from part i of Lemmas 1:1 and 1:2.
Moreover, since sprese  sparle (part iii of Lemmas 1:1 and 1:2), it follows from the
budget constraint that 'pres  'parl and, given that `i (') is strictly increasing in
', we must have `presi  `parli for any constituency. Note that 'pres < 'parl and
`presi < `
parl
i whenever e = H or e 6= lm, which implies that E('pres) < E('parl)
and E(`presi ) < E(`
parl
i ). The result that E(sprese ) > E(sparle ) follows directly from
part iii of Lemmas 1:1 and 1:2, while E(spresl )  E(sparll ) is due to 'pres  'parl
combined with the fact that sl (') is increasing in ', and strictly so if the legislator
represents a poor constituency (from assumption 1:1). 
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A.2.4. Proof of Proposition 1.2
Let  ij  Pr (e = i; lm = j), where i; j 2 fL;Hg. The probability of each
conguration of the o¢ ce-holderspreferences can be expressed as:









































































































Observe that the expected quadratic distance between the public policy and
the median voterspreference is given by:
E[(x  L)2] =  LH(x (L; H)  L)2| {z }
case I
+  HL(x (H ; L)  L)2| {z }
case II
+  HH(x (H ; H)  L)2| {z }
case III
where we have used the fact that x (L; L) = L under both regimes.
Next, observe that, when  = H   L large enough, we can always guarantee
that:
(A.10) (xpres (L; H)  L)2 < (xparl (L; H)  L)2
and
(A.11) (xpres (H ; L)  L)2 > (xparl (H ; L)  L)2;
that is, when e = L and lm = H (case I), the public policy is closer to L
under presidential systems, while, when e = H and lm = L (case II), the
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public policy is closer to L under parliamentary systems. The requirement that
 be large enough is su¢ cient to rule out the cases where (xpres (H ; L)   L)2
 (xparl (H ; L)   L)2. Intuitively, this situation occurs whenever yp and  are
small enough, so that it is inexpensive for the poor to incentivize a misaligned
president to propose a policy that is very close to L. As we have shown in the
proofs of Lemmas 1:1 and 1:2, the weight in the public policy attached to the
preference of a misaligned leader increases with  in a presidential system (see
equation (A.4) and discussion in the last paragraph of the proof of Lemma 1:1),
while the weight attached to the preference of the median legislator increases with
 in a parliamentary system (see equation (A.5) and discussion the last paragraph
of the proof of Lemma 1:2). Finally, observe that, when e = H and lm = H
(case III), the parliamentary system is always worse to the poor:
(A.12) (xpres (H ; H)  L)2 < (xparl (H ; H)  L)2,
since xparl (H ; H) = H and xpres (H ; H) < H .4
Thus, in order to guarantee that the parliamentary regime yields better policies
in expectation, the conguration of preferences e = H and lm = L (case II)
must occur with high enough frequency relative to the other two possibilities.
Here, we show that there always exists  large enough, so that the probability
4The fact that xparl (H ; H) = H is an immediate consequence of equation (A.5), while
xpres (H ; H) < H follows from equation (A.4), which guarantees that the preference of the








! +1, provided that np > nr+1, so that there always exist a threshold
 such that if  >  the parliamentary system is preferred in terms of the public
policies it generates.































































The algebra involved in the proof is straightforward, but lenghty. Here, we simply
skecth the main steps of our argument. First, it is possible to show that both



























































Intuitively, when  ! 1, we have  LL ! 1 and  HL;  LH ;  HH ! 0, i.e. the
"dominant" case is e = L and lm = L. Next, applying the LHospital rule, we







The requirement that np > nr + 1 is in order to guarantee that there are enough
poor representatives in the assembly so that Pr (lm = H) approaches zero rapid
enough. 
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A.2.5. Proof of Proposition 1.3
Part i. Observe that, in a presidential system, the incentive compatibility con-
straint (ICe) pins down the utility of the executive leader, so that:
(A.13) V prese () =




2 if e 6= lm
while, in a parliamentary system, we have:
(A.14) V parle () =




2 if e 6= lm



















2, when e 6=
lm.5 Therefore, it must be that E(V prese ) > E(V parle ): 
Part ii. In a parliamentary system, the utility of a legislator whose preference is
aligned with the median representative is determined by the condence requirement
constraint (CR):





5Here, we consider the most favorable case for the prime-minister, where the constraint se  0 is
not binding, so that  = n1 p and x
parl = e+(n=1 
p)lm
1+(n=1 p) . See discussion is the last paragraph
of the proof of Lemma 1:2:
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Observe that the expected utility of this same agent is strictly smaller in a presiden-





and E(xpres lm)2 > 0.6 Thus, conditional
on belonging to the "winning coalition", a legislator is always better o¤ under a
parliamentary system, i.e. E(V presl (l = lm)) < E(V
parl
l (l = lm)). On the other
hand, an agent who is not aligned with the median type may actually do worse o¤
under a parliamentary regime, given that in this case the public policy is always
implemented far from his preferred position.
Note that the expected utility of a representative can be written, in general,
as:
(A.16) E(Vl) = Pr (l = lm)E(Vl (l = lm))| {z }
parliamentary sys. preferred
+ Pr (l 6= lm)E(Vl (l 6= lm))| {z }
presidential sys. may be preferred
Therefore, as long as the probability that a legislator is aligned with the median
type is su¢ ciently large, we have:
(A.17) E(V presl ) < E(V
parl
l )
Formally, there exists  such that if Pr (l = lm)  , then the above expression
always hold. In particular, it is guaranteed to be satised whenever Pr (l = lm) =
1. The exact value of the threshold  depends on the parameters of the model. 




is due to the fact that 'pres  1  n , which, in turn, follows
from sprese   (see equation [A:6]).
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A.2.6. Proof of Proposition 1.4
Part i. The utility of the poor voters is given by:
(A.18) Up = (1  ) yp + 1





(x  L)2| {z }
term II
Let us rst consider term I. Observe that when p is arbitrarily small, i.e. p ! 0,
we have, for any possible conguration of o¢ ce holderspreferences:
(A.19) (1   pres) yp + 1












which follows from the fact that  parl = 1 and lim
p!0
`p (') = !L (see equation
[1:7]). Thus, when p ! 0, we obtain:
(A.21) (1   pres) yp + 1

` ('pres)  (1   parl)yp + 1

`('parl);
with strict inequality when  pres < 1. Next, consider term II. Note that when 








which follows from fact that, in this case, the "dominant" conguration of prefer-
ences is e = lm = H , so that xparl = H and xpres < H .7 Therefore, combining
(A.21) and (A:22), we can guarantee that E(Up;pres) > E(Up;parl), whenever p and
 are su¢ ciently small. 
Part ii. Observe, rst, that when p is large enough, i.e. p ! 1, we have, for
any possible conguration of o¢ ce holderspreferences:
(A.23) (1   pres) yp + 1










which follows from the fact that, in this case,  parl =  pres = 1 and lim
p!1
`p (')
= '.8 Thus, when p ! 1, we obtain:
(A.25) (1   pres) yp + 1

`p ('pres)  (1   parl)yp + 1

`p('parl);
7See discussion in footnote 4.
8In order to prove that pres = 1, suppose, by contradiction, that   1 is not binding. In this
case, the Lagrangian multiplier associated with this constraint is equal to zero, i.e.  = 0, so
that the rst-order condition in equation (A:2) can be expressed as ('pres) 1 = yp, where we
have assumed that 'pres  'o holds, i.e. 1 = 0. Observe that, since 0 <  < 1 and 0 < yp < 1,
we must have 'pres = (1=yp)1  > 1 (thus, indeed, 'pres > 'o). But this implies that pres  1
must necessarily bind in equilibrium, which is a contradiction.
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E(xpres   L)2 > 1
2
E(xparl   L)2;
which follows from Proposition 1:2. Therefore, combining (A.25) and (A.26), we
can guarantee that E(Up;pres) < E(Up;parl), whenever p and  are su¢ ciently large.

A.2.7. Proof of Proposition 1.5








fE(U r;parl U r;pres)g = Ef`r('parl) 1'parl `r('pres) 1'presg




f`r(') 1'g = 1 + (  1)'
`r(')
r
Substituting `r('parl) = r'+ !L, we obtain:
@
@'
f`r(') 1'g = 1 + (  1)'
r'+ !L
r;









The above result combined with the fact that 'parl  'pres, with strict inequality
when e 6= lm, implies that @
@r > 0: 








fE(U r;parl   U r;pres)g = E(1   parl)  E(1   pres);





= E( pres)  1  0;
with strict inequality when E( pres) < 1: 
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A.3. Extra Figures and Tables
Figure A.1: The Referendum Ballot
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics
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APPENDIX B
Checks and Balances and Political Transparency
B.1. Proofs
B.1.1. Proof of Proposition 2.3
We solve the model for a stationary equilibrium. The proof proceeds as follows:
we, rst, solve for the equilibrium in each case (A:1, A:2, B:1 and B:2) and, then,
consider the optimal strategies of the agenda setter and the voters in his group for
all possible values of the parameters.
Equilibrium
Case A.1. In this case, the optimization problem is given by:
(B.1) max
fslg;ffig;
1   + fa
subject to 8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
f + s  3 (BC)
sm + W   (ICAm)
sa + W  3  ( + W ) (IC1a)
fm = 1  
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and the aggregate incentive compatibility constraint can be written as:
(B.2) s = 3 (1  W )
In equilibrium, the continuation value is WA:1 = 1 and we have:
A:1 = 1;
(B.3) sA:1 = 3 (1  ) ;
(B.4) sA:1a = 3     2
and
(B.5) fA:1a = 3   (1  ) ;
with fA:1m = 1   and fA:1n = 0:
Case A.2. In this case, the optimization problem is given by:
(B.6) max
fslg;ffig;
1   + fa
157
subject to 8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
f + s  3 (BC)




sa  2 (IC2a)
fm = 1  
and the aggregate incentive compatibility constraint can be written as:
(B.7) s = (2 + )  W
In equilibrium, the continuation value is WA:2 = 2+
3 2 and we have:
(B.8) A:2 = 1;
(B.9) sA:2 = 3 (1  ) 2 + 
3  2 ;
(B.10) sA:2a = 2
and
(B.11) fA:2a = 
2 + 
3  2 ;
with fA:2m = 1   and fA:2n = 0:
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Case B.1. In this case, voters in a prefer to propose a policy such that fm =
fn = 0: This implies that legislator m is not reelected in equilibrium, given that he
approves this proposal against the interests of his voters. Thus, the continuation








The relevant optimization problem in this case is given by:
(B.13) max
fslg;ffig;
1   + fa
subject to 8>>>><>>>>:
f + s  3 (BC)




sa + W  3  ( + W ) (IC1a)
and the aggregate incentive compatibility constraint can be written as:
(B.14) s = 3  W
In equilibrium, the continuation value is WB:1 = 3
3  and we have:
(B.15) B:1 = 1;











with fB:1m = f
B:1
n = 0:
Case B.2. In this case, the relevant optimization problem is given by:
(B.19) max
fslg;ffig;
1   + fa
subject to 8>>>><>>>>:
s+ f  3 (BC)




sa  2 (IC2a)
and the aggregate incentive compatibility constraint can be written as:
(B.20) s = (2 + ) + W
In equilibrium, the continuation value is WB:2 = 2+
3 3 , by equation (A.12), and
we have:
(B.21) B:2 = 1;
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(B.22) sB:2 = (2 + )
3  2
3  3 ;
(B.23) sB:2a = 2
and
(B.24) fB:2a = 3  (2 + )
3  2
3  3 ;
with fB:2m = f
B:2
n = 0:
Optimal Strategy of the Agenda Setter
Proceeding by backward induction, we start by deriving the optimal strategy
of the agenda setter. First, consider the case where the voters in a adopt a strategy
consistent with a proposal that satises Um (q)  1  . In this case, we compare
the agenda setters payo¤s under A:1 and A:2. From equations (B.4) and (B:10),
it follows that:
sA:1a  sA:2a $ 3     2  2;
so that the agenda setter adopts a strategy consistent with equilibrium A:1 if, and
only if,
(B.25)   1  
2
while, otherwise, he implements a strategy that leads to equilibrium A:2.
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Next, consider the case where the voters in a adopt a strategy consistent with
a proposal such that Um (q) = 0. In this case, we compare the agenda setters
payo¤s under B:1 and B:2. From equations (B.16) and (B.23), it follows that:
sB:1a  sB:2a $ 3    
6
3    2;
so that the agenda setter adopts a strategy consistent with equilibrium B:1 if, and
only if,
(B.26)   3 (1  )
7  
while, otherwise, he implements a strategy that leads to equilibrium B:2.
Optimal Strategies of Voters in a
Moving backwards, voters in group a formulate their reelection strategies taking
as given the optimal behavior of all other agents. Their problem is to decide
whether to formulate a voting rule that will induce the agenda setter to propose a
policy q such that (A) Um (q) = 1   or (B) Um (q) = 0. There are three regions
of the parameters to consider:












   1
Case 0   3 3
7  . Suppose, rst, that 0    3 37  , in which circumstance
the agenda setter always adopts a strategy consistent with equilibria A:1 and B:1.
We compare the voterspayo¤s under these two cases. From equations (B:5) and
(B.18), it follows that:
fA:1a  fB:1a $ 3   (1  ) 
3
3   ;
which can be re-expressed as:
(B.30) 2   7  
3
 + (1  )  0
Observe that by substituting  = 3 3













Furthermore, note that for any  such that 0   < 3 3











since, for this range of the parameters, we always have M > 0. Therefore, when
0    3 3
7  , voters in the agenda setters district always choose to adopt a
strategy consistent with Um (q) = 0, so that the equilibrium always falls into
category B:1.
Case 3 3
7  <  <
1 
2
. Next, suppose that 3 3
7  <  <
1 
2
, in which circumstance
the agenda setter always adopts a strategy consistent with equilibria A:1 and B:2.
We compare the voterspayo¤s under these two cases. From equations (B:5) and
(B.24), it follows that:
fA:1a  fB:2a $ 3   (1  )  3  (2 + )
3  2
3  3 ;
which can be re-expressed as:






















7  <  <
1 
2
. It is, therefore, possible to show that: (1) if 3 3
7    
, then the equilibrium falls into case B:2, while (2) if     1 
2
, then the




   1. Finally, suppose that 1 
2
   1, in which circumstance
the agenda setter always adopts a strategy consistent with equilibria A:2 and B:2.
We compare the voterspayo¤s under these two cases. From equations (B:11) and
(B.24), it follows that:
fA:2a  fB:2a $ 
2 + 
3  2  3  (2 + )
3  2
3  3 ;
which can be re-expressed as:
(B.33) 2   9 (3  )
16    +
9 (1  )
16    0
Let J ()  2   9(3 )
16   +
9(1 )


























  9 (1 + )
16   ;
which can be shown to be always strictly negative for any  2 [0; 1]. Furthermore,
observe that the derivative:
@J ()
@
=    9 (3  )
16  
is always negative for any   9(3 )
16  . But, since
9(3 )
16  > 1, it follows that
J () is strictly negative for any  such that 1 
2
   1. Therefore, whenever
1 
2
   1, voters in the agenda setters district always choose to adopt a strategy
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consistent with Um (q) = 1  , so that the equilibrium always falls into category
A:2.
Summary
The following table provides a summary of the characterization of the equilib-
rium:
parameter region case
0    3 3
7  B:1
3 3
7      () B:2





   1 A:2















Public versus Secret Voting in Committees
C.1. Proofs
C.1.1. Proof of Proposition 3.1
We start by deriving the necessary conditions for the existence of a fully competent
equilibrium. First, note that we need to guarantee that all competent members
who are biased against the state of the world,  6= !, prefer to vote correctly
rather than abstain or vote incorrectly. Under a fully competent equilibrium, the
expected utility of voting correctly for these members is:
U  6=!;pc (vc = !) = + ;
while the expected utility of voting incorrectly is:




























where e! 2 fA;Bg denotes the alternative contrary to the state of the world. Ob-
serve that, in this case, voting according to bias is always preferred to abstaining,
since the reputation reward associated with both situations is zero. We, thus, need
to guarantee that:
U  6=!;pc (vc = !)  U  6=!;pc (vc = e!) ;
and re-arranging the expressions derive above, we obtain:






Second, we need to make sure that the incompetent members prefer to ab-
stain rather than to vote for their prefered alternative. Under a fully competent
equilibrium, the expected utility of abstaining for these members is:







































while the expected utility of voting according to their biases is:






































In this case, we need to guarantee that:
U ;pnc (vnc = ;)  U ;pnc (vnc = ) ;
and re-arranging the expressions above, we obtain:
(C.2)   (n  1)







Note that since (n 1)
2+(n 3)  1, it follows that (n 1)2+(n 3)  1(1+n 32 )(1 )n 2 < 
+ 1
(1+n 32 )(1 )n 2
, so that expression (20) is the binding constraint, i.e. whenever
condition (C:2) is satised, then so is (C:1), while the opposite does not hold.
Next, we proceed to derive the necessary conditions for the existence of a
partially competent equilibrium. As before, we must guarantee that all competent
members who are biased against the state of the world,  6= !, prefer to vote
correctly rather than abstain or vote incorrectly. Observe that, under a partially
competent equilibrium, the expected utility of voting correctly for these members
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is:









































while their expected utility of abstaining and voting incorrectly are, respectively,
given by:






































































































In this case, we need to guarantee that:
U  6=!;pc (vc = !)  max

U  6=!;pc (vc = ;) ; U  6=!;pc (vc = e!)	
It is possible to show that whenever   , i.e. when the common value is larger
than the bias term, then U  6=!;pc (vc = !) > U
 6=!;p
c (vc = ;) > U  6=!;pc (vc = e!), so
that the above condition is always satised; while when  < , then U  6=!;pc (vc = ;)
< U  6=!;pc (vc = e!), so that the we must impose that:
U  6=!;pc (vc = !)  U  6=!;pc (vc = e!) ;
and re-arranging the expressions above, we obtain:





(1 + )(n 1)=2+1 (1  )(n 1)=2

Moreover, we need to make sure that the incompetent members prefer to vote
for their prefered alternative rather than to abstain. Under a partially competent
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equilibrium, the expected utility of voting according to their biases is:
































































while the expected utility of abstaining is:






































































































Thus, we need to guarantee that:
U ;pnc (vnc = )  U ;pnc (vnc = ;)





























which is always satised. Therefore, the necessary condition for the existence of a

















(1 + )(n 1)=2+1 (1  )(n 1)=2

173
Notice that, since (n 1)
2+(n 3)  1, it immediately follows that pfull < ppart, i.e. it is
always harder to sustain a fully competent equilibrium than a partically competent
one. 
C.1.2. Proof of Proposition 3.2
This proof follows the same steps used to derive proposition 1. The only di¤erence
is that the reputation rewards under a fully and a partially competent equilibrium




















i=1 Ifvi=!g is the total number of correct votes. All conditions derived
above remain the same, except that the term  now appears divided by n. This
change captures the fact that, under secret voting, the impact of an agents vote
on his own reputation is diluted across other members of the committee. The full
proof is omitted for brevity. 
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C.1.3. Proof of Proposition 3.3
Observe, rst, that when   , the:
 >
(n  1)



















so that a fully competent equilibrium can never be sustained under public or secret
























so that   spart !   ppart.
Second, note that when  < , then:
























so that a partially competent equilibrium can always be sustained under public or






















so that  < pfull !  < sfull. 
C.1.4. Probability of Correct Decision
For a given set of parameter valuers, the probability of a correct decision under a
fully competent equilibrium is such that:
Pfull = 1  1
2












Next, under a partially competent equilibrium, we have:



























where  + 1
2
(1  ) is the expected fraction of members who vote correctly, while


























is the expected proportion of members who vote correctly in this case.



















! Pbias = 1
2
Finally, note that Ppart > Pbias, since the fraction of members who vote cor-
rectly is larger under a partialy competent equilibrium; i.e.  + 1
2
(1  ) > 1
2
.
Furthermore, starting from a fully competent equilibrium, it is possible to show
that the probability of a correct outcome can never increase when an incompetent
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member deviates from abstaining to voting. Note that, in this case, we would have:
eP 1full = (1  )n1  12 (1  )n

+











 (1  )n 2	| {z }
 1
;
where  1 is the probability that a correct decision is obtained given that an in-
competent member votes for his preferred alternative. This expression can be
re-written as:











It, then, follows that P 1full > ePfull, since 1   12 (1  )n 1   n 14  (1  )n 2 <
1   1
2
(1  )n : This argument can be repeated iteratively to show that allowing
additional incompetent members to deviate cannot increase the probability of a
correct outcome. Therefore, we conclude that Pfull > Ppart. 
